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INTRODUCTION
Since the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.

t

Japan in

1945,

'the American Society has been

aware of the tremendously destructive energy which 1s
_bound up in the atom and which can now be released by
scientists.

Furthermore t soo1ety 1s becoming increas

ingly aware o'f the prospects of atomc energy 'for peace
ful purposes--1.n medicine and in industry.

It is, then. 

the powert'ul physioal properties of atomio energy which

the American people realize.
Atomic energy t however, bas a secondary power which
1s potentially. nearly as dangerous as its well-recognized
physical powers.

This secondary power has its innuence

on the relationships of the govermnent and sooiety to
soientists.
In the atomic age, the scientist's position has

changed 1n relation to the government ,now that much of
the oontemporary research is controlled by the government.

The scientist's position has also ehanged in relation to

the American society as a whole.

The scientist- as a per

son has beoome removed from society since his way ot Ute-
I

his motivations, his personality, and the conditions neces
sary f'or his work--are no longer understood by 800iety.

4,
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The basis for this Senior Bcholar paper 1s the secon

dary power of atomic energy--1ts interweaving effects on
the scientist of government policy and the attitudes of

the government and society toward the scientist.

My

primary aim in this paper is to present a picture of the
meaning of science. the scientific personality, the changes
in science, whioh are

~ed

With Bocial and governmental

ohanges, and the clash of the government with science, as
exempl.1fied by the security hear1.D8 of the lead1.ng atomio
scientist, J. Robert Oppenheimer.

The political aspeots

of the seoondary power of atomic energy are directly shown
1n the Oppenheimer hearing, while the social aspeots appear

more subtly 1n various quotations throughout the paper.
In a study of the meaning of science, the conditions

necessary tor its successful pursuit, and the personality
of scientists, it becomes evident why the very nature of
science is not compatible with government seourity measures.
My purpose 1n presenting the Oppenheimer hearing is to
g1 va the reader a picture of the contemporary scientist,

rather than to pass judgment on soientists in general, on
Oppenheimer specifically, or on the security regulations.
For further consideration of the Oppenheimer case, the
reader is refe·rred! to the tull trans'cript ot the hearing_
or the condensed version oompiled by Miohael Wharton. and
to the texts of prinoipal documents and letters involving
the oase (see bibliography).
Throughout the paper I have extensively used quota
tions from leading sc1ent,lsts, government officials, and

6
laymen whioh oontribute to an understanding ot contemporary
thought of the soientist and ot his ohanged position 1n the
atomio age.

I have attempted in this paper to give only a

fee11ng for the scientist's position, not to pass judgment
on the seouri ty measures used by the government, or even to
suggest what the government or soientists should do to give
the max1.mum proteotion from atomic warf'are.

I do not attempt

to make suoh jUdgments since they are obviously completely
out of my range of capabilities or experience.
experienoe has

~nvolved

of the government.

My personal

little contaot With the oomplexities

I have had no acquaintance With atomic

scientists, and have known other scientists only throUghout
my tour years at college and in a genetios and oancer research
laboratory during one summer.

I feel only slightly more oom

petent to m8ke an oooasional Judgment on sooiety' s attitude
toward soientists sinoe I have had experience as a member ot
society.

For the most part, therefore, in this paper I have

relied on other people I s knoWledge of the problems in the
atomio age whioh concern the relationships o-r soience to
government and sooiety.

My major sources for general know

ledge about my Senior Soholar topic have been the "Bulletin
o't Atomio Solenti ats" and the wrltinge of J. Bronowski,

James B. Conant. and J. Robert Oppenheimer (see biblio
graphy) •

•

PART I.

SCIENCE t SCIENTISTS, AND SECURITY

CHAPTER I
THE MEANING OF SCIENCE

In the age of modern progress, scient1f1c thought and

the meaning of science have become 1ncreasingly removed
from the general life of the American society.

Stnce the

start of the atomic age this gap between scientists and
society has become dangerously wide, but at the same time

it has become more important tor science to be understood
by society.

The

follo~

statement made

b1

a researoh

doctor, Hans Selye, presents the problem of the gap between
science and the 1.ayman thus:
Until reoently most of us engaged in basic
research saw no reason to eJrPla1n our work or
our motives to the public. We felt there was,
someth1ng VUlgar 10. discussing our peouliar
p,roblems W1 th people not fully prepared to ap
p,reelate all the t1ne technioal points. and that
1 t would be an immodest bodytor attention. We
'felt that the singular world of bas1c .research
cou1d beunder.stood only by those who l1ved 1n
it. To attempt to explain it in lay 1.ane;uage
seemed hopelese and even ohildish •.. NoW' , bOWever,
as Be'rtrand Russe'll puts It, "Not only w111 )nan
of science have to grapp~e with the scienees
that deal With man but--and thi·s is a tar more
diffioult matter--they will have to persuade
the world to listen to What they have dtscovered.
It they canno·t suoceed in this difficult enter
prise, man will destroy himself by his halfway
cleverness.
The basia research of today produce.s both
the lifesaving drugs and the destructive weapons
Of tQUlorrow. Its outcome will affect everybody,
and in a democracy whose people decide how wealth
shall be distributed everybody shares the respons1....
bll1ty ot develop1ng the nation's scientific
potential. But how can a.nybody vote intelligently
W1thout some grasp of the problems' bearing upon

a
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that development?
Bridging the gap between the scientist and
the general public will not be easy. The former
will have to leam to transla.te his problems
into a langua.ge meaning:f'ul to the layman; the
latter will have to realize that t however simpli
fied, the essence of basic researoi cannot be as
assimilated without mental e:ffort.
Any scientist attempting to convey the meaning of

soience to the layman is aware of the extreme difficulty
of the problem; he reallzes that the gap between himself
and the layman is in faot immense.

If the scientist 1s to

become an integral part of society in the atomic age, he
must convey the meaning of Bcienoe to society to help to
bridge the gap mentioned by Dr. Selye.

The meani ng of

soience is not wholly ooncerned with the definition of
science and knowledge of the SUbject matter involved, but
1s ooncerned in a larger sense with the feeling for
soienee--the atmosphere ot axei tement in d1soovery of the
unknown.

The soient1st, James B. Conant, past president of
Harvard University and a scientific advisor to the govern
ment, attempts to convey the mean1ng of soienoe to non
soient1sts through his teaching and his books, .Qn
Understanding Sclenc&2and Soience and Common Bense~
Conant maintains toot, sinoe it would be obviously imprac
tioal and exoeedingly inconvenient to have each layman be
a laboratory apprentice, some of the feeling for scienoe
should be oonveyed through teach.1ng.

Soience is not, as

the student usually believes, an orderly series of methods,

observations t and conolusions as wrltten in modern sclen

10

tifle journals.

A young scientist, Wa1tar Roberts, aptly

states:
There is & tremendous difference between
scienoe as 1t is done 1n the laboratory and
soienee as it is reported. True science is
helter-skelter, depend~ on one's bunohes,
a.ngers, and inspirations, and the research
itsel~ is done in a very personal fashion.
'1'h1rty or forty yeaPs ago" 1 t was written up
this way. In reporting a great disoovery a
solent1st, would say ,"I was working on such
and-such a reaotion when 1 dropped some
sulphurio acid by mistake. When I examined
it ,I found, to my surprise, e. strange thing
going on ••• " But \O<1&y nobody would write
it up in this way.
AccorcUng to Gerald HGUt.on of Harvard:

It is part of the game to cover up the
transit10n from the private to the public
state, to make the results in retrospect
appear neatly der1ved from clear fundamentals ..••
Months of tortuous t wasteful effort may be hid
den behind a f'ew elegant paragraphs with the
sequence of' presented development running
direotly opposite to the actual chronology,
to theSconfUsion of' students and historians
alike.
Conant believes that in teaohing the understanding of
soienoe, history of specific scientific discoveries should
be presented.

The student should knoW' the type of' th1nk1ng,

the scientifio concepts, and the course of aetion followed
which lead to a. discovery.

The student should thus see

nhow error may give way to less error, confusion to less
confusion, and bewildermel:lt to insight. u6

J. Robert

Oppenheimer, a leading atomic scientist. in hie lecture on
"Physics 1n the Contemporary World,n expresses skepticism
that one can re-oreate the experience of science
as an artifact ••. For it is in ~act difficult, al
most to the point of impossible, to re-create
the climate or opinion in which substantial errors
about the physical world. now no longer enter~

11

talned, were not only held but ware held
unquestioned as part of the obvious mode of'
thinking about reality. It is most diffi
cult to do because in all human thought only
the tiniest fraction of our experience 1s 1n
focus, and 'because to th1 s focus a. Who Ie
vast unanalyzed account of experience must
be brought to bear •.. There 1s sometb..1ng
irreversible about acquiring knowledge; and
the stmulatlon of the search for it differs
in a most profound way from the reall ty.
In fact, 1t would seem that only those who
had some firsthand experience in the aoquisi
tion of new knowledge in some disciplined
field would be able truly to appreciate how
great the science of the past has been, and
would be able to measure those giant aocom
plishments against their own efforts to pen
etrate a few ml1leme+ers farther in darkness
that surrounds them.
If' the general public realizes that there 1s more to scienoe
than knowledge of the subject matter and of the charaoter

lstics of Bcience, a substantial decrease in the remoteness
of the scientist has been made.
Soience does have many qualities which can be described
and expla.1ned to lead to an understanding of it by the lay
man.

One definition of science can be stated thus--the

accurate observing and recording of pertinent natural
Phenom_na,8 from Which likenesses and unities are seen
bet~en

previously known faots or concepts. and conclusions

are drawn which, through experiment, oan be tested to deter
mine their val1d1 ty.

An exploration of the implioations of the above def1n1

tion 1s pertinent here.

The foundations of true sclence

11e in accurate. unbiased observations.

The unexpected as

well as the expected must be reoorded without error.

Dr.

Hans Selye in an article on basic l"esearch points out that

12

the scientist "must la.ck prejudice to a degree where he can
look at the most 'self-evident' facts or concepts without
neoessarily accepting them, and. conversely. allow his
imagination to play With the most unlikely poSsIbI11ties." 9
The truth of science comes only :from accuracy, which in turn
is charaoterized, according to Oppenheimer, by a
total laok of authoritarianism which 1s hard to
cQmprehend or to admit unless one has lIved with
1t.- This is accompllshed by one of the most exaot
ing ot intellectual disciplines. In physios the
worker learns the possibility of error very early.
He learns that there are ways to correct his mis
takes; he leams the tutlUty of trying to conceal
them. For it is not a f'ield 1n which error awaits
death and subsequent generations fo·r verdict-
the next issue of' the Journals will take care of
it. The refinement of techniques for the prompt
discovery of' error serves as well as ~~ other as
a hallmark of What we mean by Bcience.
8elye also points out that great discoveries in science are
"true not merely as facts but also in the way they are inter
preted ••. they must be oorrect and seen in proper perspective.
Otherwise the finding may be misleading beoa.use of the

~erence8 drawn from It."ll
Science is further characterized by being pertinent and
important.

Selye mentions a paper "describing the mean

weights of the internal organB of laboratory rats. 1112

The

author' B experiment lacks the quality of true scienoe since
"the resulting information was of l1m1ted importance. being
neither generalizable nor surpr1stng."13
Thus science 1s a gathering of accurate. important facts
about natural phenomena.

But, as J. Bronowskl, a contemporary

soientist, observes. science does not stop here.

A man with

13
. wholehearted beet intentions of contributing to the scienti'"
fic world might spend his lifetime collecting aocurate and

.
impartial observations, but in the end'""'e'Would
have oontributed
nothing of value in true scienoe if he drew no conclusions
from them. 14 It is seeing the importance, the likenesses
and the un1 ties of observations, and forming true oonclusions

from them which charaoterizes science.

Soience is thus a

oreative process.
The oreative prooess of scienoe as deseribed by Bronowsk1
is similar to the oreativity generally attributed to the arts. 15
In both the arts and soience one looks for "a new un1 ty m the
variety of nature. n and tries to t1.nd "a Ukeness between
things which were not thought aUke before. nl6 , The oreative
prooess of science as explained by Bronowski.
1s the discovery at each new step of a new order
which gives unity to what had long seemed ~ke.
Faraday did this when he closed the Unk between
eleotricity and magnatism. Clerk Maxwell did it
when he linked both w1:t.h light. Einstein linked
time With spaoe. mass With energy. and the path
ot light past the sun with the flight of a bullet;
and spent his dying years in trying to add to
these~likenesBes another, w~ch would t1nd a
single imag.1native order between the equations
ot C1iU Maxwell and his own geometry o'f gravita
tiona "(
The creative actiVity ot science. further. lies "in the pro
cess or inductlona n18 That ie, as Franoie Bacon 1n 1620
and Cristlan Huggens in 1690 saw:
it is not possible to reach an explanat10n or
What happens in nature by deduotive steps"
every explanation goes beyond our experience
and thereby 'beoomes a speculation. a .no induction
is unique; there is always a set-an infinite
se~r alternatives between which we must Choose ••.

14
The man who proposes a theory makes a choice-
an imaginative choice which outstrips the
facts ••• Every induction is'a speculation and
it guesses at a unity which the facts present
bUt do not strictly imp1y.19
The creativity of science is thus the bridge between data

and true science.
Science is also characterized by a

~c

quality-

an active independence which does not respect tradition or
man-imposed authority.

Bronowsk! aptly says, liThe world

won't change if we don't oontradict our elders. n20 In order
for soience to advance it must contradict previous science

if it is false.

It cannot accept the raIse word of anyone,

no matter how experienced or important he may be.

Science

thus discovers the unexpected and discards the irrelevant
and false.
It 1s the progress of science which makes it interes
ting.

If scientists were to deal only with past science

they would soon lose interest. 21

If they were to acoept

authority other than truth they would soon lose science.
History bas many examples of man's attempts to rule nature,

none of which have sucoeeded.

In Russia, for example, the

government decreed that Lamarck's theory must be the offi
cial one used by their scientists.
credited, stated that the

This theory, now dis

tonn~tlon

of new traits in an

organism to yield a new species arose by need of the organ

lsm and were perpetuated by use.

Thus, in time of food

shortage the giraffe developed the trs.1t of a long neok 1n
order to obtain higher leaves.

ThroUgh use of this neck the

15
trait. 1s perpetuated.

Due to the authoritarianism of the

Russian government in imposing Lamarck's theory, their

progress in genetios and evolution were delayed many years,
sinoe true science could not be built on a false theory.
A further quotation by Bronowski states:

We gain our ends only with the laws of nature;
we contro 1 her only by understanding her laws.
We cannot even bully nature by any insistence
that our work shall be designed "to give power
over her. We must be content that power is the
by-produot of understanding. 22
Science is further oharacterized by its need for com
munication.

The new scientist in his first experience in

a research laboratory 1s usually amazed to discover the
extent of communication witb1.n the laboratory and with
the scientific world at large.

GenerallY,scientists talk

lnf'ormally with their fellow workers about their research
problems, as well as in seminars whioh are frequently held
to aoquaint scientists with the work being done within their
own speoialization or With other projects 1n the laboratory.
Idea.s are exchanged, mistakes pointed out, and new l1nes
reasoning are shown.

or

New direction and Vitality are thus

frequently given to research.
Bclentif'ic journals play an invalua.ble ro Ie in the
progress of soience.

There are a Wide variety 9f these

journals covering most areas of science.

Journals such as

"Biological Abstracts" and "Chemical Abstracts" sm nmarlze

art1cles from journals co,verlng

&

l1m1ted scientific area.

They thus serve as a quick reference to obtain informat1on
on &speclf1c problem.

Out of the vast number of' Joumals

16
pUblished, the scientist usually subscribes to only a few
which publish articles on his partioular field of interest.
A research scientist frequently corresponds with

scientists working in other laboratories or privately on
the same or a related field.

'tlb..en he publishes results he

generally sends reprints ·of the journal article to other
scientists who are tnterested in following the progress of
his work, and 1n turn he receives reprints which relate to

his research.

An active researcher tends to publish his

scientific progress frequently, so that he has thus a
"crowd of witnesses Which surround him, n23 checking the

validity of his work and giving Vitality to it.
Oommunication, rather than extensive planning is essen
tlal in science.

According to Warren Weaver in an article

on the "Encouragement of Science,"
what keeps the total scientific effort ~m being
chaotic and mea.n1ngless is not central planning
or any attempt to achieve it, but a kind ot grand
intellectual homeostas1e, under whioh a 1I1Ult1 tude
ot inf1uence~ 1nteract-1n a natural way. What
science needs is not a lot ot planning, bUt a lot
ot convenient communication, so that controls may
arise naturally from feedback.
It can be seen tn summary that communication ot science
-

1s important through informal contacts, organized seminars,
and Journal publications.

Communication gives direction to

science, it cheeks errors, decreases needless repttitlon
of

1nvest1gat~on,

transmits the progress of science, and

glves 1ncentiv8 and direction to science.

An understanding of the differences between basic-
or PUre science--and

a~pl1ed

soience is necessary 1n a

17
consideration of modern science.

Conant defines basic

research as "scientific work ••• undertaken without regard
for any practical appl1cation of the knowledge. "24

Belye(

gives a similar definition, referring to basic research as
lithe study of natural laws for their own sake, irrespeot1va
of immediate appllcabil1 ty--wi th emphasis on the qualifi
cation 'immediate t.1t

25 He further qualifies basic

research as only the totally unp1.e.nned and unexpected which
1s acciden1Jilv' discovered.

These basic discoveries uform

the basis of all premeditated projects," whiCh he calls
"development ll • 26

The 1n1tlal phases of developmental

research, as Selya uses the term, are} however, generally
considered as part of basic research.
Basic research does not, contrary to popular belief,
necessarily mean working entirely without plan.

27

In fact,

most good basic research 1s built on a plan, but discovers
phenomena l'1h1ch were not in the original plan.

The paths

of the scientist" working in basic research branch many times.
He must choose the path to follow, leaVing interesting side
paths unexplored.

The scientist may later return to some

of the divergent paths for investigation, but unfortunately
many potentially good fields remain untouched.
It is basic research wlch forms the foundation for
applied research.

When a definite application for facts in

basic research 18 found, or When a particular goal 1s in mind
and scientists draw from a reserve of basic
term "applied research ll is used.

resea.rc~ the

The development of atomic

18
bombs is therefore called applied research.

The bomb has

its founda.tions in a long history of basic math and physios
which found that energy could be obtained by splitting the

atom.

Scientists did not set out to split the atom; they

disoovered its possibilities while exploring the nature of

matter.

It can be seen, therefore

t

that applied research

1s dependent upon the wide fund of knowledge accumulated in
basic research.

CHAPTER II
THE SCIENTIFIC PERSONALITY

ADo you

t~

that scientific men as a rule are rather

peculia.r individuals?"l

This question was put before a

leading scientist during the seourity hearing of the
scientist, J. Robert Oppenheimer.

What is it about the sci

entist that subjects him to be classified as a. "peoulia.r
individual," not only in the opinion of the general public,

but also in a government investigation?

In response to the

above questions, this chapter explores the personality of
the "generalized" scientist, in and outside of his labora
tory.
Influences such as science fiction have given society

an unfortunate stereotyped oonoept of the modern scientist.
Several years ago, Dr. Margret Mead and Dr. Rhoda Metraux
conduoted a survey on students in

145

typical high schools

to determine their opinions or ooncepts about scientists.
The folloWing direct quotes from the survey questionnaires

reveal certain oonoepts of these students conoerning sclen
tists.

The scientist is a brain ••• His work is uninteresting,
dull •.. and J though he works tor years, he Dlay see no
results or may fail ••••
He may live in a cold-1t8.ter flat ..• If' he works
tor a big oompany. he .•• is just a oog in a machine.
If he works for the Government, he has to keep
dangerous seorets •••.
He neglects his family--pays no attention to
his wife, never plays with his children. He has
no social life, no other intelleotual interest, no
hobbies or relaxations. He bores hle wife, his
children and their friends ••. with incessant talk
that no one oan understand .•. He 18 never home.
19

20

He 1s always reading a book. He brings home
work and also bIgs and oreepy things ••.
Quotes on the favorable aspects of the scientists say he 1s
livery intell1gent--a. genius or almost. careful, patient, and
dedicated," however, the students still IIdon't want to be a
scientist or to marry one."

2

Drs. Mead and Metraux feel that these statements refleot
not only the attitude of the students, blt also of their
parents.

One

must realize the possibiUty of detrimental

etfects on the soientifio profession if such degrading
opinions about the scientist are widely held.

SUch concepts

might easily discourage men from entering scientific fields.
One might expect that this would also lower the morale of
men already in the profession.

In addition, there is pot,en

tis1 danger in any stereotype even though it may be comple
mentary, sinoe it suggests unreality.

When one neglects the

aspect of individuality there is consequently oreated a laok
of reality which expands with the increased differences among
the members of the stereotyped group.
mo&t human

oi..bove c211~

Scientists are.., fePe

beings, with the variable human traits ot orig

!nail ty and indi viduall ty.

Consequently t the ll.m1 ta tiona in

a description of the "generalized" scientist must be kept in
mind in the following discussion.
Three basic questions may be asked to help in an under
standing of the scientist:
tist?

What motivates him to be a scien

What are the traits of the scientific mind?

How does

the scientist work?
One of the prime motivations of the scientist involves

21
a curiosity about the unknown. and a desire to investigate
the unexplored regions of nature.

Dr. Harold Orey, a

prominent American scientist, speaks of science and the
scientist's curiosity thus:
Science is an intellec'tual pursu1t 1n whioh men
attempt to understand and accurately describe
natural phenomena o,t all kinds. In these studies,
scientists do not attempt to do useful t.hings.
They are prompted by curlos1ty J which 1s a charao
teristic ot many primates besides man .•• It 1s
surprising indeed that aotivity which is really
so removed tor any practioal purposes should ,
almost invariably be so practical in the end.
Furthermore, the scientist in his explorations of the
unknown likes to know that he 1s oontributing to the
rapidly growing oody of scientific knowledge.
The scientist also enjoys the experience of the
oreative activity in science.

It gives him satisfaction

to make observations, see new likenesses, and synthesize
oonoepts rrom them.

The oreative actiVity gives tbe s01

entist "a sense both of riohness and of

understand1ng.lI~

He enjoys the logio and order of soience and takes pride

in seeing a job well done.

The following quote by Urey

expresses the feelings of many men who have been drawn to
soienoe.
No other intellectual pursu1 t 0 f men has expanded
men's knowledge by so many orders of Dlagni tude
and 1 t has g1 ven him such a magnitio1.ent under
standing of the orderly and .intrioate structure
o-t natural things and the orderly succession ot
events with time. Those ot us who are prlVileged
to partake of this intelleotual interest beeome
exoeedingly htUnble with respect to the small
amounts wh1ch we lnd1 vldually know as campa-red
to what is known, and the unkno'Wn as compared to
the known. No end of the development is 1n sight. 5

22
Pure intellectual pursuit, desire to add to the know

ledge of basio science, and enjoyment of logic, order, and
creativity are not the only motives of all scientists.
A great number of men, especially in medical research, have
a humanita.rian desire.

Much has been told of men in suianee

who have given their lives in the hope

o~

tion Which would relieve human sUffering.

revealing

~orma

Any layman has

heard stories of brave fights against disease by scientists
such as Dr. Walter Reed, who died in the lattle against malaria.
Other factors Which usually do not play a major part in
the motivations of most scientlsts,but which must oertainly
be oonsidered, are the desires to make money and to receive
recognition.

Since the salaries of scientists. other than

those of Bome men in industrial laboratories, tend to be
small, the desire to make money does not usually motivate
people to choose science as a profession.

Positive recogni

tion such as that given to Salk for hie pollo vaccine is
certainly desired by many scientists.

However, since the

chance of receiving such recognition is sl1ght}it seems
unlikely that the desire for such recognition is important
in the scientist's motivations. It is indeed unfortunate
that so mueh of the scientist's recognition is negative.
as exemplified by the passages already quoted from the
Oppenheimer hearing and from the high school students.
Thus, any motivations of the soientist for positive recog
nition may be overshadowed by his desire to avoid deroga
to ry cornmen t .
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It 1s interesting to note how closely the traits

or

the scientific mind are allied to those of other scholars.
Acoording to Bronowskl.,
a recent study he.s indeed shown that J as a
profession, science attracts men whose tem
perament is grave, awkward and absorbed.
Bu t thi s 1 s in the main the s cha lar I s tem
perament, which 1s shared by historians and
11 tergry ori tics and pe.inters in the minia
ture.
The psychologist: Frank Barron, in a report on tI'l'he

Psychology of Imagination," states that "oertain uniformi
ties do seem to oharacterize highly original soientists
and artists." 7 Barron continues, "There is 11ttle doubt
that most people dislike being confronted with disorder.
In 1ndividuals who turn out original work in scienoe or
1n art, however, a reversal of the usual attitude may be

observed. n8

Using the Rorschaoh inkblot test,it was found

that the more original scientists and artists tend to give
u an interpretation of the blot which takes account of all

details in one comprehensive , synthesizing image ,II ra.ther
/

than seeing only a segment of the inky shape. 9

Comparison

of answers g1ven regarding the same ink blot shows such

oontrasting responses as the scientist's answer "a small
boy and his mother hurrying along on a dark windy day,

trying to get home before it rains, II and the response of
the less creative individual "dark clouds" .. lO
Another characteristic of the creative individual
described in Barron' a article 1s Ilindependence of jUdgment .. till
The scientist or the artist placed in a group which accepts
a false statement tends to challenge the validity of the
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statement rather than conform to the group's opinion.
Barron further states, "The creative individual, in his
generalized preference for apparent disorder, turns to the
realized Ufe of the Wlconscious, and is likely to have
more than the usual amount of respect for the forces of
the irrational in himself and in others. 1I

He counts the

irrational in himself as lithe most promising source of
novelty in hie own thought. II

Scientists and artists "want

to own themselves totally ••• and perceive a shortsightedness
in the claim of society that all its members should adapt
themselves to a. norm for a. g1 ven time and plaoe."

12

It appears from the above material that it is not the
basic personality traits of the scientist which distinguish
him from men in other intellectual pursuits.

Rather) the

distinguish.1ng factor may be found in the code of discipline
enforced on the scientist by his profession.

Bronowski

desoribes the effects of the discipline on scientists thus:
They do not make wild claims, they do not
cheat, they do not try to persuade at any cost,
they appeal neither to prejUdice nor to author
ity I they are often frs.n.k: about their ignorance,
their dis.putes are fairly decorous, they do not
contuse what 1s being argued with race, politics,
sex or age, they listen patiently to thel~oung
and to the old who, both know everything.

Orey also descr1bes the honesty of

scientlsts~not

only with

the facts but also with their fellow workers:
Scientists must be honest people with respect
to their scientific work.J and 1t 1s this rigid
honesty that ia responsible for the great advances
of science. No misrepresentation of facts or dis
honest· interpretation of them is tolerated" and men
who engage in such-practiwes become ostracized by
respectable scient1sts. Moreover, scien'ce 'requires
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cooperation between men,and in order that such
cooperation shall eXist proper relations between
scientific men must exist. It 1s customary for
scientific men to refer carefully to the original
work of other people. To do otherwise would be
to assume that one thought of things and did things
which he did not do and thus beoome dishonest in
onets dealtngs with fellow scientists. This
respeot for the other man t s work is as essential
to the suocess of soience as is the honest pre
sentation of the individual t B own ideas and data.
We cannot emphasize too strongly the solid success
of soience and the respect Which
has earned 1s
due to this rigid code of ~h1CB. 1

!t

It 1s also part of the scientist t s code to report what
he finds. regardless of the consequences.

sents

d1ffleultie~81nce the

This orten pre

scientist, again like the

artist, works With concepts Which are not neoessarily
acoepted, but Which may in time become accepted. lS It was
necessary for Darwin to present his findLngB on evolution
even though they were not acceptable to society.

Had he

suppressed them to save h1mself from attacks by society he
would have betrayed

~he

scientific code.

It 1s interesting to. speculate on the origins of scien
tific honesty in the scientist.

Urey maintains that

scientific training is not responsible for this
honesty of approach to scientific problems, for
a person I s scientific training is largely secured
long after the foundations of character have been
established. Scientific training only selects the
objective, honest person. It doe!6not make unre
liable people into reliable ones.
Conant and BronowBki. on the other hand. agree that it is
the scientific tradition which makes honesty essential in
soience.

Conant states it thus:

The traditions he (the scientist) inherits,
his instruments, the high degree of' specializa
tion, the crowd of wi tneases that surround him t
so to speak (if he publishes his results)--these
all exert pressures that make impartiality on
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matters of his science almost automatic. Let
him deviate from the rigorous role of impartial
experimenter or observer at his peril; he lOlows
all too well what a fool so-and-so made of
himself by blindly sticking to a set of' observa
tions
a theory now clearly recognized as in
error.

Ii'

BroDowski on the same topic states that codes such as
honesty tlhave grown out of the practice of Bcience,
because they are the inescapable conditions for its
practice. H18 History shows the scientist What happens if
he deviates from the scientific code.

Bronowskl says,

"A scientist "lho breaks this rule, as Lysenko has done,
1s ignored.

A scientist who finds that the rule has been

broken in hi s la bora to ry, as Kammerer found, kills himse If • n 19

The latter sentence of this quote obviously is exaggerated
since the usual practice 1n such a situation would be to
"f'O

fire the offender rather than'commit suicide.

However, in

spite of the exaggeration, the quote still indioates that
history can serve as a guide to scientists.

It thus seems

probable that the scientist is honest 1n his work because
of the nature of the work.

It does not necessa.rily force

him to be honest outside of his profession.

Indeed, as CDDant

states, onoe the scientlst
leaves the laboratory behind him he can indulge
his fancy all he pleases and perhaps with all
the less restra1nt because he is now free from
the imposed discipline of his calling. One would
not be surprised t therefore, if, as :regards matters
beyond their professional oompetence, laboratory
workers tlere a 11 ttle less impartial and selt
restrained than other men, though my own obser
vations lead me to conclude that as human beings
sc.1entlfic investigators are s,tatlstically
dlstrib.1ted over the _Whole s~8trum of hW!lS.D folly
arld wisdom much as other men.
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The above statement by Conant serves to introduce a
consideration of the scientist outside of his direct work
with Bcience.

It must again be stressed that scientific men

are human beings.

The exacting nature of their work and

their remarkable achievements. may tend to dehumanize them
in the public opinion.

However, as Bronoweki says. in spite

of their " v irtues"
Individually, scientists no doubt have human
weaknesses. Several of them may have mis
tresses or read Karl Marx; some of ~~em may
even be homosexuals and read Plato.
Although objectivity is the scientific ideal. subjectivity
is frequently evident in the scientist's work.

Ris method

of approach to a problem and the observations which he makes
are frequently colored by preconceived notions and may
influence the interpretation of his data.

Scientists, like

other men, also may be subjective when dealing with anything
outside of scientific facts.

Personalities, favoritism,

and the usual prejudices of race, religion, and social class

are influential in business and social contacts of the 8c1
entiat.

Such sUbjeetivity may play an important part in

hiring a scientist and in determining his work and salary,
much as it does in other professions.
In summary, it can be said that there are certain basic
motives and personality traits which tend to be characteris
tic of scientists.

However, one must avoid stereotyped

concepts of the scientist,since such stereotypes neglect the
important individuality of scientists.

Scientists have a

strict code Which they must follow in their work, but out
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side of their direct contact with science "scientific
investigators are statistically distributed over the whole
spectrum of human folly and wisdom much as other men. "22

CHAPTER III
CHANGES IN SCIENCE AND IN

THE SCIENTISTIS POSITION

For an understanding of the posl tlon of contemporary
scientists, it is useful to survey the history of the s01
entist's relationship to society and the government, and
the changes in acience which have brought about the
soientist's present position.
Until the mid 18th century, science was extensively
undertaken by amateurs.

1

It was, in fact, an intellectual

pursuit followed by most upper class men.

Even if the

leaders and other educated men did not actively partioipate
in Bcience. they usually had at least a knowledge of it and
interest in its progress.

It was thus closely bound to the

total culture of the sooiety.

For example, Goethe, the

German who is primarily noted for hie poetry, also made
valuable contributions to science with his work on skull
development.

Benjamin Franklin in American history is a

prime example of a statesman, philosopher, writer, and
printer who also experimented 'nth science.

Science under

these conditions was therefore respected as an integral
part of the cUlture,as long as it remained purely intellec
tual and did not radically upset the "status quo. 1I
If scientists expressed new concepts which attempted
to force the general public to change 'their ideas drastlcal
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1y or affect their lives, they were challenged by society.
Science has nevertheless frequently upset this "status
quo, II as can be seen by its history of suspicion and
persecution.

In the Middle Ages it is evident that science

was orten confused with black magic and sorcery.

2

Later

scientists became regarded as "enemies of the church."'
Andrew Wb.lte' s book A History of the Warfare of Science with

Theology 4 , follows the relationship of religion and science
to 1895.

Contrary to White's belief at the time of his

wr1 ting, the warfare had not stopped, as can be seen by

numerous articles and books written on the subject today.
Scientists are still accused of being irreligious and des
troying religious ideals.
Although the upsetting of religious beliefs has caused
most of the friction recorded in the history of science.
other concepts have also been upsetttng.

The reasons for

the disfavor, however, usually have their basis at least
indirectly with religion.

The Copernican heliocentric

doctrine caused much disrepute and condemnation of science.
Having thought of the earth as the enter of the universe,
it was difficult for the society to conceive that the earth
actually revolves around the

SWl.

In 1859 t Darwin upset

contemporary thoUght and was disliked for his theory on
evolution.

"Even a.s late as 75 years ago a scientist •.•

who proclaimed a new theory was likely to be met with angry
vltuperation. tlS

It seems thus in history that science was

ass1mllated into the lives of intellectuals and tolerated
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by the

soc~ety

as long as it did not radically affect their

religious beliefs or other ways of thinking or living.
The history of s,cienc'e shows a shift from a purely
intellectual undertaking to a practical one with direct
application.

Along with this shift there has been a. change

in society's attitude toward science and a change 1n the

relations of science to the government.

Daniel Dubarle

traces these transformations in his article tlObservations
in the Relations Between Science and the State. It

Although

Dubarle is a Frenchman, his observations are applicable to a
study of American scientists.

According to Dubarle:

The great founders of modern Bcience, from the
beginn1.ng of the seventeenth century through
the whole classical age, were able to confer on
their activities the dignity appropriate to one6
of the greatest undertakings of the human race.
Around 1780,when the first possibilities of the steam engine
were seen, the practicality of modern science still seemed
remote~and

for another 150 years science remained mainly an

intellectual pursuit.
sponsored

by

Research was done individually or

small private industries for practical purposes.

Although in the nineteenth century science was prevalent
as an intellectual pursuit, the practical application of
soience caused a

s~ft

in the general attitude toward soienoe.

The purely intellectual ideal ot the seventeentl;1 century was
a thing of the past.

Science and technology became increas

ingly mutually involved since the technology was dependent

on Bcience, While in turn soientific developments required
more specialized instruments which were perfected by tech
nologists.

The n1neteenth century has been called the
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"oentury of triumphant Boientism."

The oentury " whioh be

lieved that it actually was witnessing final verification
of what had previously been only vaguely sensed and dreamed

of by the great pioneers of science. 117
By 1900. scientists were essentially free to publish

their findings without strong public disapproval. 8

At this

time they had little money for research, hut were essentially
9
free to pursue their own ohoice of work.
Although the soi
entific world was still relatively small and unimportant,
it was regarded with dignity by the society.

In the first half of the twentieth century there was a
marked change in the relations of science to the government.
According to Dubarle:

The basic reason for this rapid change is that science
has become s. major 'source of the pOwer at civilized
me.n ••• science hae come more and more to be thought of
as the knowledge of the practical possibilities - ot
human action on nature; thl s type c'f knowledge in
creases with technclo,gieal needs of humanity rather
than a's the result of a purely intellectual interest
InpenetI1lj1ng ever deeper into the seorets ot the
universe.
Furthermore, Dubarle states that government control of science
is now necessary sinoe it is lithe only organization on a scale
suffioient to deal with modern science. 1I1l

rapid period of ohange has moved

from

Science in its

an tndividual proposi

tion, to lJrivate group and industrial proJects, to the present
government dominated pro1"ession.

In 1900 there was no evi

dence of the change in rela.t.ion of soience to government,
while by 1915 the beg1nD1ng of this new control was ert.dent.
By 1940 the transformation of the relation of science and

state' was

Ilin

.
12
full swing. II

In the early 1940' s, ma.ny

s,e1Etntists were supported by the government
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while working on the development of atomic energy and other
government projects.

During this brief period little atten

tion was given to the scientist by society.

Although res

tricted by security measures, he was well paid and respected.
Immediately atter the atomic explosions in 1945, the
scientist received much attention.

He was respected, indeed

almost worshipped by many, for ending the war.
elevated respeot for the scientlst was

However, thiB

Short-l1V~d.13 Moral

1ssues were discussed 1n relation to the bomb.

Society began

to feel that scientists were mass killers and had too much
power over the society.

According to Eugene Rabinowitch,

an American scientlet and editor of the "Bulletin of Atomic
SCient1sts ll

,

scientists were

peculiar people, lacking proper Bocial responsi
bility, patriot lam , and loyalty--a dangerous
breed whose inventions were useful, but whose
intrusion into the political arena was undesir
able and whose influence on national i4faire
should be curbed as much as possible.
The Widely publicized cases of Allan Nunn May and Klaus
Fuchs, the. scientists Who betrayed secrets to foreign gov
ernmenta,
lent support to popular suspicion that scientists
1n general are deficient in national loyalty.
Since about 1948, scientists in America have been
in the doghouse.
The campaign which led to effec
tive e11mination from public life of J. R. Oppen
heimer, the tlfather of the atomic bomb, II WRs1a
fitting climax to this twilight of the gods. ~
Scientists thus found that althOUgh they had ample money
for research they were not free to choose their projects of
interest, nor were they respected by society or the govern
ment.
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William Whyte stresses in his book The Organization
~fun

that the organization scientist 1s prominent in the

twentieth oentury.

The individual genius 1s no longer con

sidered important; it 1s the research team which is belng
16
promoted.
Indeed, according to Whyte, there 1s an attempt
to eliminate the genius from governmental and industrial
researoh.

In 1945, the Federation of Amerioan Scientists

whioh was created,

aecord~

to Rab1nowitch,

to give science a voice 1n pUblic affairs, soon
became an eas-entlally def.ens,lve organization,
devoted mainly to warding off the worst conse
qu~nces of the tide of anti-soientific sent1ment.
Despite a certain relaxatlon of the tensions
which arose in the heyday of Senator McCarthy,
American .scienttsts remain in 1956, a harrassed
profession, occupying a defens1ve posltlon 1n
the political aren~. Their early hopes of play
ing an important role- in l.nsur~ world peace
and prosperity are in abeyance.
In October 1957, a new period of scientific history

commenced with the firing of the Russian Sputnlok.
tists again found themselves in the public eye.

Scien

Since the

advent of Sputnick the scientist has been more valued by
society and given more respect.

However, he still finds

himself hampered by government security regulations causing
restrioted working and living conditions.

CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURES FOR SECURITY

Atomic energy has proved 1n the span ot a few years
to be extremely powerful, not only by its aotive physically
destructive forces, but secondarily by its influence on
government scientific policy and on the attitudes of soc
iety toward scientists.

When weapons are as powerful as

the atomic or hydrogen bombs, capable of destroying whole
oommunities in a single flaSh, security measures are neces
sary for maintenanoe of the scientific
sential for national satety.

1

pre-e~ence

so es

Unfortunately, it is at

present dubious if the security measures have achieved
either their aim of soientific superiority or of national
safety.

However, they have clearly been effective in res

tricting scientific development; promoting excessive fear
of atomic energy; leading to unfortunate, detrimental and
at times irrational security investigations; and fostering
m1lsunderstanding, distrust, and even dislike of scientists
by the society.

The scientist, therefore, in addition to

putting up with the hindranoe of security measures in his
work and personal life, and the annoyance of the sometimes
ruining security investigations, must contend with the
ohanged attitudes of society toward him.

In order to under

stand the effects o'f the security procedures, one must first
have a knowledge of what 18 involved 1n the government IS
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security program--the need for security measures, the nature
of the governmental policy toward atomic development, and the
structure of security measures.
Walter Gellhorn, in his book Security. Loyalty. and
Science, indicates"the position of scientific secrecy in dev
elopment of weapons thus:
the United States, like other oountries, will
seek to conoeal progress from the eyes of
potential enemies in order to maintain the
advantage thet inventive skill may temporarily'
g1 ve it. Moreove.r, since the element of sur
prise is itself deemed a military asset, not
only the details ot ~echan1sm8 but also the
extent of the ave,11ab1Uty may sometimes be
regarded as "mllitarr secrets," to be W1thh~l~
from the knowledge" of competitors if possible.
Gellhorn continues that the scientist now finds himself not
only the "guarcllan of military secrets t" but also their
3
"creator."
This dual function of the scientist plAoes him
in an extremely important, as well as precarious. position.

As seen by the spy cases of Dr. A1an NUIm May and Dr. Klaus

Fuchs, who

be~ra1ed

atomic information to foreign powers,

security measures are necessary to try to prevent such
4
occurances.
There is 8. very real and serious danger of
espionage in scientific development which could cause incal
culable d.am9.ge.

The danger of foreign agents obtaining

aocess to information which may be important to national
defense must therefore be averted by rational security mea
sures. 5
-The early stages of atomic development, Which were car
ried on by scientists working on their

lI

own Initlative,n6

were una:ttected by security measures.

Security became im

portant by late 1941) when plans were aotively underway for
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the wartime development of atomic energ.v.

By June of 1942

the army had taken charge of the atomic energy project 7 with
the formation of "a new district 1n the Corps of Engineers."8
For security reasons the project, which was originally labled
the "DBM" Project. for Development of Substitute Materials,
was changed to the "Manhattan District,"9 commanded by
Br1gad.1,er General LesUe R. Groves.

10

The Manha.ttan District ,which supervised building of the
atomic bomb, also had jurisdiction over security regulations.
The end of the war brought with it the question of tuture
oontrot and development of atomic energy and weapons.

11

The

May-Johnson Bill, proposed in 1946, advocated Army respons
ibility for continued development of atomic energy.12
fl'\ef'

proposal was: ~needles8 to say, aet

Wi th

This
..

strong disapproval

by scientists who had experienced enough army regu1ations
during the wartime development.

There was strong feeling.

especially by scientists, to have a civilian commission
control the atomic energy program.
Early in 1946, Senator McMahon summarized seven major
cons1derations involved in a bill regarding further atomic
development Wider civilian control.

This bill, which was

SUbsequently passed, is known as the MoMahon Act.

Three of

the important considerations stated by McMahon are as follows:
Other oountries will be able to make atomic
bombs. The monopoly Which we. hold at present
is precarious and is certain to be short
lived. The secrets which we hold are matters
of sc1ence and engineering which other nations
can and will discover ••• We can give ourselves
a certain temporary protection by retaining
the secrets we now have. But that protection

grows weaker day by Clay ••• Military control of
atomic ,energy. though necessary and useful
during war,~ls a form of direction to Which
scientists 1n peacetime will not willingly SUb
mit. The continuation of such control will
probably discourage further development and
research ..• On the other hand, the armed ser
vioes are entitled to extensive participation
1n this develGpment insofar as it relai~B to
mil1tary application of atomic energy.
The

McMahon Act, in the words of J. Robert Oppenheimer.

advooated extending
th~ mandate for secrecy, appropriate perhaps
to weapons, in principle to all the res,t o'f
the field. It gave the United States govern
ment, through the Atomic Energy Commission,
ovne,raMp and control Of flssions:ble, material •
. . • •It llm1 ted, almost to the polnt of exclu
s10,n, coope1"ation on problems of atomic power
wi th any f'o,reign governments, scientists or
industries. It severely 11m1ted the role of
private initiative in the development or
~tom1c pbwer~
It took" those steps which
seemed most 11.kely to prolong and for a1lhlle
to preserve, our monopoly in the field.
-.,

,

Another document, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report,
"sketched a. radically different but closely related alter
na.tive." 15 This report
in a very different wa.y •••• is also responsive to

the considerations set forth by McMahon. It
gave an indication ot the conditions under which
the Un1ted States could, With reasonable prudence,
be prepared to assist in liquidating its monopoly
and to participate 1n international oooperative
development o~ the peaceful aspects of atomio
energy, and 1n international control, to see that
neithe.r nuclear weapons n~6 the making o,t them
fell into national handa.
Al.thou.gh the McMahon Aot was advo,oa.ted by scientists over
the

May-J~hnson

statements

~hat

Bill, it can be

1nter~d

from Oppenheimer's

scientists would have preferred the condi

tions set forth 10 the A.oheeon-Lilienthal Re,port to those
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in the

Mav~n

Bill.

However, the MCMahon Bill was enacted,

"establishing the basis for ••• management of atomic energy
n17
affairs.
The McMahon Act, also known as the McMahon-Douglas
Atomio Energy Act, 18 or simply the Atomic Energy Act, gave
the A.E.C. the responsibility of determining presumptive
security riSKS, and granting security clearance to A.E.C.
employees or to those permitted aocess to restricted mater
1al. 19

The Act prov1des for investigation by the F.B.I. of

all 1n oontaet with restricted data.

After investigation,

the F.B.I. turns over its findings to the Atomic Energy
Commission for a decision.

JUdgment according to the Act

1s to be an tlover-all common-sense JUdgment, made after oon
sideration of all the relevant information, as to whether
or not there is risk that the granting of seourity clearance

would endanger the national defense or security.n20
In attempts for national safety by security measuresJ
the security gained by "ooncealment" must not overshadow the
value of security by "achievement.,,21

The McMahon Aot recog

nized this conflict 1n Section 10 (8.), stated as

follo~:

It shall be the policy of the Commi,se1on to
control the dissemtnatlon 01 restricted data in
such a manner as to assure the common defense
and aecurlty. Consistent with such policy, the
Commission shall be guided by the following, prin
ciples,:
(i) That until Congre,8s declares by Joint resolu
tion that effective and enforceable international
safeguards against the use of atomic energy for
destructive purposes have been established, there
shall be no exchange o,f information with other
nations with respect to the use of atomic energy
for industrial purposesj and (2) That the diesem~
ination ot scientific and technical information
relating to atomic anergy should be permitted

and encouraged so as to provide that free
interchange of ideas and criticisms ~ch
1s essential to scientific progress.
In making security jUdgments the A. E. C. must try to balance

the possible risk involved in clearing a questionable indiv
idual with the importance of such person to the scientific
project.
To guide the A.E.C. in its judgments the McMahon Act
set up the following two categories.

Category A deals with

"matters of personal conduct or character," while B concerns
"matters in the realm of ideas or associations which do not
reveal any aotual misconduct on the part of the indlvidual. n23
A summary of the considerations in category A reveals the
following pointe. 24 Security is questionable if the indiv
idual or his spouse has been
1.

involved in sabotage, espionage, treason or sedition.

2.

involved with foreign espionage agents.

3.

a member in a sUbversive organization.

4.

in favor of using force to alter the government.

5.

found to have deliberately omitted or falsified
faots on a Personal Security Questionnaire of
History Statement.

6.

incautiOUB of security regulations or has violated
them.

7.

mentally unbalanced without evidence of cure.

8.

convicted of felonies, or has shown cr1m1nal
tendencies.

9.

excessively addicted to alcohol or drugs.

Cases which fall in category A thus contain derogatory in
formation about character and conduct. indicating & presu.p
tlve security risk.

The MAnager of.Operatlons of the
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district in which the indt vidual is working has "the alter
native of denying clearance or referring the case to the
Director of Seourity in Washington. It

25

Category B, which includes most cases whioh have
It

required thought before a decision was reached u26 concerns
j

the following aspeots dealing primarily with ideas or associ
ations: 27 When the individual or his spouse has

1.

sympathetio association with members of subversive
ideologies.

polltio~l

2.

sympathetic association with members of subversive
organizations.

3.

identification with a "front" organization when
personal views are sympathetic with subvereive
ones.

4.

identification with a group infiltrated by
subversives with whom he may be associated.

5.

close relatives in nation whose interests may
be inimical to interests of the Un1 ted Statee

and may influence the individual.

6.

close continuing association with subversives.

7.

had olose association with subversives whioh
are likely to be renewed.

8.

had conscientiOUB objection to war service for
reasons other than religious convictions.

9.

tendencies of unreliability, inability to keep
secrets, abuse of trust, dishonesty or
homosexuality.

It is thus seen that cases under B include classes of
"derogatory information where the extent of aotivities,
the attitUdes or convictions of the individual must be
weighed in determ1~ whether a presumption of risk eXlsts."28
In such oases the Manager

or

Operations has author1ty either

to 'grant or deny clearance, or if in doubt about the
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individual he may refer the case to the Director of Security
in Waehington. 29
The seourity procedures of the A.E.C. apply only to
individuals employed directly or indireotly by the Commission.
The A.E.C. has relatively few direct employees, moet of whom
are working on the administrative procedures.

The majority

ot the people involved in A.E.C. clearances are workLng

indirectly for the Commission on projects which are being
oarried on under oontract in universities, industrial
laboratories. and huge installatlons owned by the Commission.
Laboratories such as Oak Ridge. which is corporation owned,
Los Alamos and the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, both
owned by the University of California, have been created by
the government but are administered by industrial or aoademic
contractors.

Suoh laboratories hire their own staff, but
30
are subject to A.E.C. seourity clearanoe.
In the event of security denial a prospective employee
has no chance of appeal.

However, if already employed under

previous clearance,the individual receives notice that his
clearance 1s about to be withdrawn.

He may then ask for a

hearing before a local personnel security board
by the Manager of Directed Operations.
consists of members of the A.E.C.

appo~ted

The board usually

a~istrative

staff, a

good local attorney, and a scientist who is familiar with
the work of the lndi vidual in question and his function and
importance to the pro ject.

After investigation) the board

reports l'ts findings to the manager, who in turn reports to
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the A.E.C. General Me.nager in Waahington.

If the decision

is again adverse to the employee,he may ask for a review of
his case by the Personnel Security Review Board.

The General

Manager eleo is in a position to ask for a review of the cssa
by the Personna 1 8ecurity Board.

The Review Board then

reporte its findings to the General Manager]l who in turn
gives his recommendation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Commission then decides Whether clearance~should be glven.
It should be noted that the above procedure refers only to
oases when previous clearanoe has been granted. otherwise
no ohanoe of appeal is possible. 33
There are "three related provisions of law not contained
in the Atomic Energy Act which should nevertheless be con

sidered

I~n

a d1 scussion of security clearances1' since they

profoundly affect the conditions under which men of science
are obliged or permitted to work . .,34
The National Military Establishment provides oles.rance

for individuals working in the planning or production of
articles for military uS8. 35

Military clearance indeed

involves considerably more scientists than does the A.E.C.
clearance procedure. 36

It 1ncludes employees of three dif

ferent groups:3?
1.

Those employed by the armed services in
installations such 8S arsenals, electronics
laboratories, and guided missile programs.

2.

Government scientists employed by oivilian
agene1ea such as the National Bureau of
Standards and the Bureau of lfinee which
are engaged 1n research on military proJects.
I
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3.

IIS c lentifio personnel employed by educa
tional and other nonprofit institutions,

or by industrial corporations that have
contracted to do olaseifleSawork for one
of the mill tary agencies."
It should be noted that the latter group involves the
greatest number of soientifio personnel whioh are required
to have clearanoe. 39
All contractors working for the military services are

bound to a secrecy agreement requiring that all their work
ers have clearance.

This clearance can be granted by the

oommanding general of an area or by the Military District
10 Washington.

If the advisability of clearanoe 1s dOUbtful,

the case is referred to the Personnel Seourity Board, oom
posed of officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
clearance is

w1~hheld

It

for private work on military contract}

the individual concerned is so informed in writing, along
wi th the procedure by which he may appeal to the Industrial

Employment Review Board.
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Scientists employed directly by the military have a

still different security prooedure.

The secretary of any

one of the. three military branches has the authority at My

time to remove a military employee for security reasons.
Wi thin thirty days a.fter

such removal the individual oonoerned

may appear before an official, designated by the secretary,
to be informed ot the reasons for his removal and to state

evidence on hia

own

behalf for etaying. 41

The case i8 then

handled by the review or appeal board covering the IndiVid

ual's branch at the service.
The Executive Order Number 9835, o,r a.s more commoray

known, the Loyalty Order) involved loyalty olearanoe of all
government employees, in addition to other clearances which
an individual may bave, such as the A.E.C. or Military ones.
In the words of President Truma.n in March of 1941, lithe

presence W1 thin the Government servioe of any disloyal or
subversive person oonstitutes a threat to our democratic
processes, n and that " max imum protection must be afforded
the United States against infiltration of disloyal persona
into the ranks of its employees. "42

The Loyalty Order estab

lished that
The standard for the refUsa.l 0 f employment or
the removal from employment in an executive
department or agency on grounds relating to
loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence,
reasonable grounds eXist for belief that the
person involved is d.1aloyal to the Government
of the United States. 3
President Eisenhowerts Executive Order Number 10450 dated
April 27, 1953 1 superseded the previous loyalty order.

The

new order placed more emphasis on loyalty and the danger
of being a security risk.

Previously,t1ressonable grounds"

had to exist for dOUbting loyalty, whereas under the new
order employment must be "olearly consistent with the
interests of national eeourity."44
Eaoh Government employee or applicant must undergo a
loyalty check by the F.B.I.

This check involves finger

printing, questions under oath, reView of records from such
souroes as the Civ1l Service Commission, F.B.I., House
Committee on Un-American Aotivities, and the Military and
Naval Intel11gence.

If any derogatory information is

found~

a "full field investigation" is conducted by the F.B.I ••
which turns over its findings to the employing agency. or
to the Civil Service Commission if the person wae employed
after 1947. 45
A further type of security olearance involves inves
tigation of science students before they may receive money
for study from funds of the National Science Foundation.
Student clearances are also required for Atomic Energy
Fellowships, although no contact with restricted data is
involved in these student programs.

According to the

National Science Foundation Act. all students receiving
money from such funds are subject to F.B.I. investigation.

~

CHAPTER V

PROBLEMS OF SECURITY MEASURES

It is evident that in times 01' war. or potential war,
seorecy in regard to military affairs is especially neces
sary.

However, exaggeration of the cults of security and

loyalty have

b~ded

seorecy in science.

many people to the proper balanoe of

Un:rortunately, security is frequently

oonsidered synonymous with seorecy,l with disregard for
the loss of' security by the inevitable retardation of sci
entific progress under seourity restrictions.

As was

mentioned 1n McMahon's oonsiderations, knowledge is univer
sal, so that no amount of secrecy can prevent a foreign
po\oler from achieving 1 t independently

0

f the Unl ted States.

Since it is impossible to keep basic knowledge of atomic
secrets indefinitely. security regulations must consider
Whether "control of' atomic inf'ormatlon in the United statee ll
will "delay other nations enoug.h to warrant the resulting
impairment of our own research and of international oom1 ty ...2
Security measures thus involve a problem of balance.

"The

promotion of security by achievement cannot Wholly rule out

But it does demand that concealment

security by conoealment.

be conf'ined within the narrowest pra.ctioa.ble limits.1I'3
A report by the American Association for the Advanoement
of Science, (the A.A.A.S.), stated the matter of balance as
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follows:
As in most matters worth discussing, we deal
here not with absolute choioes but with questions
of degree and of emphasis. Our oonclusion 1s
that the information as to which seorecy should
be enforced should, in the main. be limited to
immediate military applications of scientific
findings. rather than the findtngs themselves.
Data useful for further researob. which 1s not
purely developmental ought as a rule be made
available to the scientific world rather than
reserved for the milita.ry. Inquiries which have
distinct and valuable civilian impUcations
ought not to be inhibited becau~e, at the same
time, they have a military aspect. The major
line we guggest drawing is between scientific
knowledge, that ls, recorded observations of
natural phenomena, on the one hand, and millte.ry
plans. programs, physical loottione, designs,
and mechanisms, on the. other.
There is general- agreement among both scientists and
military men that a balance must be found between security
by achievement and secur!ty by secrecy.

Although there

have been few cases of serious espionage in the history of
atomio development, any espionage is potentially dangerous.
Therefore, there must be emphasis on the need for secreoy.
As previously stated, information was revealed to foreign
powers

by

Fuchs. an Englishman, and May, a Canadian.

An

Amerioan chemist, Gold, (who was not in government service)
was involved as a trans:ferer of information :from Fuchs,
working along with

lI

a group of relatively minor figures.

II

5

According to Walter Gellhorn, "It is impressive that
not a single one of the scientists involved 1n security
clearance prooeedings during the years of Russo-American
tensi-on since World War II has been found to be
e1ther amateur or professional. u6
The Loya.ltx of Fres_Men

8.

spy t

Also, as Alan Barth in

points out. although no oases have

been found in which an American scientist has "divulged
oonfldntlal 11lformatlon a.bout atomic energy to any foreign
agent or other unauthorized person," the security prooeed

1ngs have ruined many scientific oareers.
Newspaper reports

7

ot the findings by the House Committee

on Un-American Activities have created an unrealistic 1mpres
sion of the disloyalty of Amerioan s-cientlsts.

Even such

papers as the "calm New York Times _" have had a tendenoy to

over-dramatlze the disloyalty of soientists. While analysis
of the artioles shows that there is slight basis for lIlany of
the adverse impressions which the newspapers create.

Ge1l.harn

t'eels that liThe House Committee on Un-American ActiVities has
sought, perhaps successfully, to create contrary impressions. ,,8
Furthermore, Gellhorn states that the committee's "penchant
for repetitive denunciation has apparently bef'uddled unwary

readers into supposing that there are more cases and more
proofs than 1n faot exist."9

As seen by the evidence pre

sented by Barth and Gellhorn, a.lthough there 1s much publio
concern over the loyalty of scientists ,there appears to be
no basis for the prevalent distrustful attitude toward s01
ent1sts.

Another aspect to be considered in restraint of atomia
S8crec.y pIloeedures 1s the d1fficulty of transmitting useful
information to the enemy, due to the extremely complex nature

ot atoDl1c energy.

10

Only a spy who 1s well tra1ned in atomic

science would be able to understand what 1s going on in the
development and would be able to know what informat10n 1s
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relevant.

Only such an expert would be able to comprehend

significance in chance remarks by a scientist.
ot disconneoted atomic

tn~or.mation

Small bits

from a person untrained

in scienoe would serve l1ttle purpose to the enemy.

There is, the.refore t obviously a problem of determin
ing the extent of seeur1 ty prooedures, both 1.n regard to

who should be required to have olearance and as to how much
the 1ndividual should be restricted.

The common procedure

1n seour1 ty oleara:no8s 1s to require olearance of all employ

ees of a laboratory or other place Where any restricted
material is present.

This includes not only the personnel

directly working with restricted information, but also labor

ers and clerical staff who may come 1n contact with men pos
sessing secret matters. ll When all the staff of a laboratory
have been giyen olearance, even if they do not have direot
access to restricted information, there can be more f'reedom
of communication for men having restricted in fonnation, wi th
out fear of adverse assooiates.

It is obvious, however, that

"perfect security cannot be achieved by extending clearance

merely to the 'tight community' of scientists 1n any particu
lar laboratory," since the scientist bas outside associates
whQ cannot all be clea,red. 12

It would be unrealistic to

expect ,a scientist to have contacts only

wl~

his laboratory.

An extreme ease or extensive clearances for individuals
working with unrestrioted data is exemplif1ed at the Brook
haven National Laboratory.

In 'this laboratory where most, of

the work is, done in basic, unclassified work. all the workers
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in the laboratory are required to have clea.rance because of

a small percentage of scientists Who have acoess to restrioted
areas. 13
The questions are stl11 unsettled where to draw the line

of security clearance and whether the nation gains "by extend
ing secur! ty clearanoe requirements or their equivalent to

large numbers of scientists who are not themselves engaged
in classified researeh projects and who neither need nor have

opportunity to acquire secret 1nformatlon. h14
There 1s aleo a question of the desirability of loyalty
olearances for federal employees not involved with restricted
material and for students who have no suoh contaots and where
no security risk 1s involved.

Procedures such as these olear

ly do not inorease the nation's safety.

The case of a-scientist, referred to as Dr. X, gives
insight to the basic factors involved in security investiga
tions. 15

Dr. X at the time of his investigation was working

in research for the army.

He bad a well-established reputa

tion based on his many years in research and his publication
of about forty pa.pers on physiology and biochemistry.

IUr1ng

the war he had done notable work, particularly on motion
sickness, for the Committee on Medical Research, Office of
Soientific Research and Development. and the Committee on
Avia.tion Medicine of the National Resea.roh Counoil.

In 1946,

a.fter two months I work at the Edgewood Arsenal, Dr. X was
informed by 1nte lllgence officers that his clearance was
withdrawn. and was advised to resign.

No :formal charges
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were given at this t1me, although Dr. X was told that he was
oonsidered a "potential risk."

The potential risk was based

.j

on such faotors as his parents being foreign born. although
Dr. X was b.1mself a native of New York; he had been a member

of two non-scientific organizations; he had been profession
ally associated with questionable men; and he attended a
leoture given by a man who was regarded by security
as a Ilfellow traveler,lI of the Communist Party.

o~ioers

Rather than

resign "without prejudice, II Dr. X preferred to have the oauses
of his security questionableness investigated.

After five

months t investigation. Dr. X was cleared, but subsequently

resigned his scientific position.
One should note

~

security investigations, in oontrast

to regular courtroom trials, the basis of judgment 1s usually
founded on a presumption that the individual in question
might do something wrong, rather than previously having done

so.

There is then a Judgment of the man, rather than "any

particular question of fact.

II

16

The contrast between 'investigation of nonprofessional

and of soientific personnel should also be noted.

Cases

involving the nonprofessionals- SUch as contractors, mainten

ance em-ployeee, and clerical staff' deal xne.1nly with the char
acter of the individual under question.

That 1s" suoh

aspects as his respons1.bil.1ty and attent10.n to regulations
in his previous jobs; hie personal habits' of dr1nk1ng; use

of money,

lnd1c~ttng

possible Busceptibility to bribes;

and his criminal record, or other indication
for obl1gations

tcs

soc1ety.

or

disregard

In contrast, in"testigations of
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scientists have ror the most part "involved not character,
but attitudes; not behavior, but associations; not person
ality, but op1n1on. 1I17

By 1950, it was evident that the

stress in security investigations had changed

rrom

subver

sive activities to subversive 8ssociations. 18
In security investigations there 1s a natural but

unfortunate tendency to pass lightly over the oomplimentary
and valuable aspects of an individual, while stressing the

derogatory ~ormatlon,19 thereby present1ng indication of
presumptive risk far greater than

aotual~

may exist when

weighed against positive aspects.
"The constant stress on security I with the attendant

discouragement of scientific interchanges, is having an
intangible but real psychological effect on Amerioan scien
tists. H20 Security rules force a hesitancy on soientists
in their oommunication.

Their scientific activities are

thus restricted to avoid divulging secret inf'onnat1on.
J'. Robert Oppenhs:1.JIler spoke o-r the t?ee collll1IU11icatiol1 8l1long

soientists as "gossip," indicating the 'h'ee, un1nbjblted
and informal ~lk which 1s so necessary for the advancement

of scienoe. 21

As Barth states,

Out of such talk comes the mutual. criticism, the
fre,sh 1nsight, the testing at preconceptions,
that are the propelling elements of the experi
mental method: and that produce a croasf'ertl11za
tion o~ ldeas •••• Formal publ1eatlon--espec1a1ly
if they are rigorousl1 expurgated.... -can never fill
this need. If' there 1s an element of r1sit to
security 1n permitting scientists to work ungagged.
there 1s also a heavy cost en~~iled in an tnsls
tence upon sterile isolation.
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Restrictions of the so1entists also carry over to the

ot teaching.

~ield

Gellhorn states that the consequences of the

restrictions in teach1n g
are especially hurtful to the nation. Because of
artificial limitations upon what can be taught J
students are all too often given imperfect train
ing 1n SUbjects that must be mastered if' the next
scientific generation is to bui~ successfully on
the foundations now being 1a1d.

Furthermore, there is a tendency for both students and teaohers
to avoid areas involving restricted material to avoid the risk
of trespassing.
national safety

Thus, many fields which are important for

are

left untouched. 24

Security regulations oause the loss of' valuable scien
tific talent in four major ways.

One of these 1s by investi

gation of scientists such as the previously disoussed case of

Dr. X or the case of Dr. Edward U. Condon.

Condon, who was

influential in the development of radar and atomic energy,
was called by the House Committee on Un-American ActiVities,
2

"one of the weakest links in our atomic security. 11 5

After

undergoing four security investigations and clearances with
the prospeot of a fifth

1nvest~gation,

Condon resigned his

position as head of Corning Glass Works to go into private
research.

He found that investigations were taking too muoh

of his time.
Talent is also lost to scientific progress when security
olearance 1s denied to- men already working in restricted
areas or to men who would like t.o enter restricted fields.
Seourity denial is exemplified by the case of Dr. Oppenheimer,
which will be discussed, 1n detail lat,er.

Oppenheimer, who
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was instrumenta.l in the atomic bomb development, was denied
eecurity clearance in 1954.
several moves to reinstate

Since then there have been
~,

but in 1959 his

serv1~es

to

atomic development are still denied by the government.

As has been previously mentioned, scientific talent 1s
lost by placing restrictions on scientific

eo~catlon

1n

laboratory discussion, informal talk by scientists, pUblica
tion, and teaching. Thus, some talent is lost from scientists
Who have been successfully cleared and remain in government

service.
Talent is lost in a fourth way from scientists who do
not want to undergo security investigation or do not want to
work under the restrictions of

S8CUri ty

procedures.

Many

scientists who would probably find no difficulty in obtain
1ng clearance nevertheless do not want to undergo the embar

rassment of investigation which delves into his past, and
which questions his relatl ves and friends.

Scientists, on

the o,ther hand, with "liberal" or nlef'tist tl backgrounds may

not want to risk the career-ruin involved if security is
dented.

Furthermore, a soientist who has himself been suc

cessfully cleared may hesitate to recommend a talented friend
for work which involves elearance in fear of ru1n.1ng the
friend's eareer if clearance is

d~nj.ed.,

Aleo, if clearance

were denied,the fact that he had been associated with a
security r1sk would cast doubt on his own record.
throUgh

Thus,

overcaut1on, valuable talent is lost for import'ant

Government work.

26
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In addition to the problems of ,obtaining seourity olear

anoe, many scientists do not want to restrict themselves to
the security regulations. or would rather work 1n a field
where they can obtain recognition for their work by publlsh
ing their results.

27

In September 1948, eight prominent Amerioan scientists

stated publioly to President Truman and Governor Dewey what
has libeen echoed privately by scientifio men of every level
of eminenoe. 1I

They "deplored the disastrous effeots upon

scientific recruitment that followed the denunciatory
sensationalism of the House Committee on Un-Amerioan Actlv
Ities. n28

The scientists conoluded furthermore that lithe

atmosphere of suspicion surrounding scientists in government
was an effeotive deterrent to proourement and use of thar

services. ,,29

The knowledge, the type of mind. and the personality

of sci,entlsts are important factors in the security olear
ances.

Aooo,rd1ng to Barth, the basic reason for the soien

tistS', predicament is that they

nO'lf t1k::tLO\'T

too much, II and

thus become "the most valued and most distrusted members of
contemporary society. II

30 Barth oontinues that

behind this distrust o'f the soientists 11e,s an
unoonscious distrust olf inte,lleotuals in general-
that is to say" of men with ideas. Ken With 1deas
are liable to be unQrthOdO~i-todayIB euphemism for
disloyal or untrustworthy,.
Barth also states t ItIt mAy well be that a mind capable of
grappling with theoretical physics would seem perpleXing
or peculiar--and therefore untrustworthy--to the mind o,f
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an F.B.I. agent. u32

In security investiga.tions it 1s evident

that the men who usually have trouble with security clearances
have been interested in soclal and political problems.

Sumner

Pike of the A.E.C •• when speaking on the sUbject of such men
and

scientific resea.rch for the government. stated:
the man Whose clearance status is called into
question are usually those who do think about
these things, the very kind of men you want
on this job. In this business many of the ideas
are likely to grow out of active minds rather
than ~~oBe which acoept things just as they find
them.
In oonolusion, it can be said that security clearances

are necessary when the
ted by one man's acts.

co~ty's

safety is heavily affec

In such a case, the risk to society

overbalances the possible damage to the individual by
erroneous security judgment.

However J when the danger to

the community is slight or absent. damage to the 1ndiv1dual

by security investigation 1s not jUstifiable. 34

It does

not seem on the basis of loss of talent, retardation of
research, and personal inconvenience that lithe extension of
personnel seourity clearances into the areas in which they

are not demonstrably necessary protects" any national
interests. 35

Security clearanceF: must be kept at a

m~

to assure the greatest protection both through secreoy and
throUgh

ach.ievement.

It has been seen that free eXchange

of scientific information is necessary Tor the advanoement
of science by stlmula:Ung work and! ideas, l':r'event1ng dupli

eatio,n of work, and leading to progres's in otherf1.elds. 36
The condition must be avoided where "failure to util1ze
fully what we learn handi.caps us probably more than 1 t does
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our competitors. 37

The United States ~rther.more must guard

against ruin of its soientists by '''character assass1..na.tlon."
An a.ppropria.tely inserted bit of derogatory information can

be as detrimental to a scientist as any method of physical
assault.

Such character assassination is a sure method of

destroying a man while involving little risk for the
assaSBin. 38

PART II.

THE OPPENHEIMER HEARING-

EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE SCIENTIST'S
CHANGED POSITION

CHAPTER VI

A SUBJECT FOR ANALYSIS
In the 1940' s and 50 t S there has been· much discussion,
speculation, and misunderstanding about the function of the
scientist, his personallty, and his relationship to the
security investigations.

Society has become aware throUgh

newspaper headlines and articles that soientists have become
important throUgh their work in the bomb development.

They

are also aware that the scientist's position both in rela
tion to his work and to the society has become markedly
changed.

They know that scientists have to work under the

security system, and that they are subject to security
investigations.

However, what is involved in a security

investigation remains unknown to most of the general public.
The public 1s aware of investigations of important ci tlzens,

notably John Paton Davies, a foreign service officer, Wolf
Ladejinsky, in agriculture, and the scientists, Edward U.
Condon and J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Of these security oases

only the details of the Oppenheimer one have been made

pub11c.

1

As W1 th the other hearings, the Oppenheimer one

had the oomplete procedures recorded in wrl t.lng.

However,

1n the Oppenheimer Case, in spite of the tact that, all the

witnesses knew· about the original pollcy to ke·ep the hear
ing re cord pr1vate, the

tra.nsc~1pt,

classlfie·d area.s, was pubUshed.

-.6.0

Wi th the except10n o,t

61
The case of J. Robert Oppenheimer is a partioularly

important sUbject for study since, a.s stated in the intro
duction, it exemplirles the position of the scientist in
the atomic age.

Furthermore, the ease is important because

it involves one of the leading atomic scientists of our
age--a man who was vital in the development of the atomic

bomb and in bringing the Second World War to a close.
Oppenheimer was influential in atomic development, not only
during the war when he was director of the atomio bomb lab

oratory at Los Alamos, but alBo in the follOWing years when

he served in a government advisory position on scientific
matters.

Eight years after the end of the war, wh11e

Oppenheimer held the latter position, the A.E.C. initiated

a fUll 1nvestigatlon to determine if Oppenheimer should be
allowed to retain his security clearance which permitted b1.m

to have access to olassified infonnation.

After the lengthy

seourity hearing, the Commission made its decision to deny
clearance to Oppenheimer.
Sinoe the Oppenheimer oase is the only seourity hearing
whlch has been published, it is the SUbject of muoh analysis,
both 1n terms ot: the trial ot a scientist and the trial of
the seour.ity system.

The transoript,which covered Bome

3.000 typewritten pages, was published shortly afier the
olose of the hearing. by the government pr1nt1ng office in

992 pages of tine print.
ba,s1s of such books

8,'S

The transoript has served as the

%he Oppenhe·Wr Case:

The Trial of

a Security System, by Charles P. Curtis; A Nation's Security:
The Case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, by JUchael Wharton;.

and We Accuse ! The StOry of the M1,searriage of Ameriean

2
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Justice in the Case of J. Robert Oppenheimer, by Joseph
and stewart AlSOP.'
Curtis uses. lengthy quotations from the hearing and
doouments relating to the hearing to 1"orm the basis of his
book.

Documents included are a letter from K. D. Nichols,

the General Manager of the Atomio Energy Commission,
stating the reasons for the questionableness of Oppenheimer's
seourity clearance; statements from the find1ngs of the
Personnel Security Board.; and statements by members of the
Oommission Which governed their decisions.

Curtis, as he

admits, 1s extremely biased in Oppenheimer's favor as he
analyses and comments on the hearing.

As a lawyer, he finds

many faults with the procedures used 1n the hearing and is
quick to point them out to the reader.

In spite of his

obvious bias, Curtis seems to be both fair and wise in the
ohoice ot passages which he quotes.

It 1s unfortunate that

the oomments by Curtis between quotations tend to be rather
inane and poorly stated.

In general, a reader would do well

to omit the comments by CUrtis and merely follow the signifi
cance of the case as it 1s presented 1n the quotations.
Wharton's book, in contrast, does not attempt to reor
ganize the hear1.ng or to comment on the significance or
legality of any ot the proceedings.

It is,rather, a condensa

tion of the hearing, removing the repeated evidence or evi
dence not concerned with the main issues.

In this way, with

the evidence "cut down to its essentials, •.• the Hearing
seems to acqUire something of the feeling and movement of
a tragic drama."4

It 1s interesting to note that Wharton's

book was published in London. England, giVing indication
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of the wide spread interest which the Oppenheimer case has
had.

The Alaops t who are well known newspaper men, .in their
book We Accuse

~,

present a strong defense of Oppenheimer

and an indictment of the present government security system.
The Alsop brothers point out the role of personality con
fliots and prejudices in the hearing, as well as the short
oo~gs

of the security system,whlch they entitle "The

Insecurity System."
It is unfortunate that the literature on the Oppenheimer
hearing has been primarily strongly in favor of Oppenheimer
and against the security system, making an objective view
of the case difficult.

However, as stated in the rntroduc

tion, this paper does not try to pass jUdgment on the
security program or on the adverse decision on Oppenheimer's
clearance.

Rather, it attempts to present a picture of the

scientist's changed position in the 1940's and 50's.

It

1s important to realize that the hearing 1s not only the
Ittrial" of e. soientist or of the security system.

It 1s

also a history of atomic development and the changed posi
tion of soientists, along with the reeult1ng contemporary
thought of and about scientists.

CHAPTER VII

A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

A brief chronology of the background and procedures
of' the hearing is useful as a framework for the following
ohapters on Oppenheimer--the man, his thoughts. and Ms
hearing.
Oppenheimer's first direct contact With atomic devel
opment took place in the spring of 1942, when Dr. Arthur R.
Compton oonferred with him on atomic bomb development and
asked him to take charge of the future organization and
development.

Oppenheimer proceeded with the responsibility

in a- study group with five other prominent scientists.

In

the fall of 1942, General Lesile R. Groves assumed the
position as head of the Manhattan Engineer District for
the supervision of the wartime bomb development.

On the

advice of Oppenheimer, he 1.n1tlated steps for the found1118
of an Atomic Bomb Laboratory at Los Alamos. New MeXico.
1942 through 1943 was

~

period of active work 1n the found

ing of. the new laboratory.

Early in 1.943, Oppenheimer was

given security clearanoe and appointed as director ot Los
Alamos.

By the spring of 1945, the laboratory had expanded

to a membership of some 4,000 persons.
The years of intensive research eulm1nated With the
sucoesstul bomb test ,of JUly 16, 1945.
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on

August 6 of the
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same year, a seoond atomic bomb exploded, this time over
Hiroshima, Japan.

Three days later it was followed by an

explosion at Nagasaki, Japan.

In October of 1945,

Oppenheimer resigned as direotor to resume teaching in
California.

At the same time, he served in an advisory

capacity for the Government on atomio energy, his main
position being Chairman of the General Advisory Committee
of the Atomic Energy Commission, whioh he held until 1952.
In 1941, he was again given clearance, this time by the

full Commission.

In the same year, Oppenheimer lefi

California to assume his new duties as director of The
Institute for Advanced StUdy at Princeton, New Jersey.

J).lring this time he continued to advise the government and
was again given clearance in 1950, which enabled him to

remain an advisor.

In JUly 1953, apropos of the PreSident's Executive
Order to review all eases involving "significantly deroga
tory inf'ormation," Dr. Walter Whitman, Chairman of the
Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense t
reviewed Oppenhelmer l s security file to determine if he
should be reappointed as an advisor for the Department

Def'ense.

or

On the basis of the F.B.I. files and his personal

oontacts with Oppenheimer, Wh1 tman recommended the reappoint
ment.
In June of the same year, Gordon Dean, Chairman of the
A.E.C., renewed Oppenheimer's oontract as advisor to the
Commission for the following year.

Early in July, within a
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week after assuming chaj,rma.nship of the A.E.C., Lewis
Strauss requested that the classified documents be removed
from Oppenheimer, and that his clearanoe be suspended.
(This request was not fulfilled until December 1953.)

Neither the

De~ense

Department nor the A.E.C. apparently

knew that Oppenhe1mer t s clearance was being investigated

by the other group.

1

In November 1953, Willlam Lisoum Borden, past exeou

tive director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
sent a strong anti-Oppenheimer letter to J. Edgar Hoover
of the F.B.I.

Bordents letter included along list of

accusations against Oppenheimer, and concluded that more
likely than not Oppenheimer was I COIDmJn1st agent.

On

December 10 of that year, the Commission voted to have the
accusations against Oppenheimer tully investigated.

StrauBS

informed Oppenheimer on the 21st of December that his clear
ance was to be suspended.

He was told that he could termin

ate his contraot or have the charges investigated.

Since

Oppenheimer preferred the latter course of action, the
procedure for the investigation and the charges against him
were made known 1n

8.

letter on Deoember 23, 1953, by

General K. D. Nichols, the General Manager of the A.E.C.
The reply to this letter 1s presented in a. letter by

Dr. Oppenheimer dated March 4, 1954.
From April 12 to May 6, 1954 the hearing before the
Personnel Security Board was held.

On Ma.y 27 t the findings

of the Board, knoWll as the Gray Board, were made known.
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Oppenheimer waived his right to review by the Personnel
Security Board and requested immediate consideration of
the case by the A.E.C.) since the time was so short before
his oontract would expire.

The report from the Commission

announced the denial of olearance on the 29th of June,

1954.

CHAPTER VI I I
WHY WAS THE HEARING HELD?

In answer to the :frequent question "why was the
Oppenheimer Hearing held?", many answers have been sug
gested.

It seems strange at first that the hearing was

neoessary at all, since Oppenheimer's aooess to restricted
material could be terminated by failing to reappolnt

~

as an A.E.C. advisor when his oontract expired in July
However, apparently it was felt that other agenoies

1954.

might give Oppenheimer clearanoe on the basis of his hav-

ing been approved by the A.E.C.

I

It is also pointed out

that Oppenheimer himself could have avoided the hearing
by resigning, as suggested by Strauss, before the clearanoe

suspension in December 1953.

However, Oppenheimer was not

willing simply to give up his position of trust, "thereby
indicating his guilt in the eyes of many.

The Alsops' book, We Accuse

~

implies that a major

cause of the hearing was involved with personality clashes,
mainly between Oppenheimer and Commissioner StrauBs.

William Borden's damaging letter about Oppenheimer to the

F.B.I. apparently "set the whole ponderous seourity

~ch

Inery 1n motion, tl but Strauss eagerly "leape d into the
driver's seat to I;I18.ke the wheels turn faster."
to

~he

Alsops:
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Aocording
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There is in Strauss something which gives him
a desperate need to condescent, to be always
agreed with, to be endlessly approved and admired,
to dominate and play the great man •••• One 0 f hi s
fellow commissioners has said of~. "If you
disagree with Lewis about anything. he assumes
you're just a fool at first. But if you go on
d1sagreei~ with him. he concludes you must be a
traitor. "
Unf'ortunatelyJ Oppenhelmer's personality has caused
him to be disliked by many people, and has caused oonsid
erable friction between him and many of his associates.
The Alsops state:

With such a man as Strauss J Oppenheimer was
fated from the first to get on badly •.•. He has
impossible high intellectual standards. He
insists on them, with more than a trace of intel
leotual snobbery and sometimes With eold soorn
for those who fall short. He has a good deal of
the arrogance of the brightest boy in class; he
is not patient with obtuseness, and his tongue
oan be very cutting. All these faults of
Oppenheimer were bound to exa~erate and indeed
inflame the faults of Strauss.

It seems unlikely that the Oppenheimer hearing oan be

attributed to any simple cause such as Borden's letter to
the F.B.I. or Strauss' personal dislike of Oppenheimer,
any more than the Protestant Rerormation can be attributed
to Martin Luther's Ninety-five Theses posted on the chureh
door at Wittenberg.

RAther both historical events were

inevitable outoomes of the conditions of their times.
that 1s needed 1s someone to trigger the action.

The

All
oondl~

tiona in 1953 were such that scientists needed freedom and
re.spect to carry out effectively their work, While with the
prospect of atomic 'war, the government needed security
measures.

Two such f\.ttldamentally ·opposite needs are bound

to ol&Bb.

The Oppenheimer hearing thUs served as the stage
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for the olash between scientists and government security
measures.

CHAPTER IX
ASPEOTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE HEARING

The Oppenheimer hearing was conducted by the Personnel
Security Board. more commonly mown as the Gray Board.

This

board was composed of three men, each of whom was prominent
in his own field. l Gordon Gray. the ohairman of the pro
oeedings, was both a successful businessman and an educator.
He had previously served as Undersecretary of the Army, and

at the time of the hearing was president of the University
of North Oarolina, as well as being owner of a number of
broadoasting stations and newspapers.

Thomas Morgan, an

industrialist, was the retired president of the Sperry
Gyroscope Company, while Ward V. Evans, the only scientist
on the board, was a distinguished professor of chemistry,

2

Throughout the hearing ~ effort was made to avoid pub
lici ty about the prooeedings.

However, shortly after the

beginning of the hearing, the contents of General Nichol's

letter stating the charges against Oppenheimer appeared
publicly.

As is well known. the transcript of the hearing

vas also published shortly after the close of the hearing,
1n spite of the previous understand1ng by all concerned

that their test1.ony would be confidential.
ThroUghout the hearing it was stressed, as Mr. Gray

stated on the first day of the

proceed1ngs~

1nquiry and not 1n the nature 0"1 a trial.
";"1

this uis an

We shall approach
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our dulles in tb$.t atmoaphere and.. in that spirit. "3

FurtherI:lore, Kr. Lloyd Garrison., the pr1.m.a.ry oouns.e·l tor
Dr. Oppenhe,imer, 'stated llear the beginning of the hearing:
We hope to present this case to you 1n
terms of unre,stricted data •••• We would like
'to present 1 t 1n that direct lay fashion.
I am not a scientist and exoept f~r Dr. Evans,
the members of the board are not.

Mr. Garrison wanted to avoid technical evidence which would
tend to obscure the main question of the hearing, which was

not whether the advice that he gave at a parti
oular time was from a scientific point of view,
one with which this board might differ in the
light of history. The real question 1s was his
Judgment and honest jUdgment~ d1d he do the best
he could for his government. J
Moreover, during the hearmg, the counse 1 hoped to te11
"exactly how the things were done which he did, and the
procedures that were adopted, the way the tasks were gone

about, and the atmosphere in whieh they were conducted. n

6

1n his service to the government.
In the course of the twenty-four days of the hearing,

forty witnesses were oalled to testify.

III of these indiv

1duals, including Dr. Oppenheimer, chose to testify under
oath.

In addition to the testimony given by soientists,

government officials, military men, and lay people, several
abstracts from writings and speeches were presented, along
With two tape recordings ot interviews involVing Oppenheimer,
which were made w1thout his knowledge.

One interview was

conducted by Colonel Boris T. Pash, chief of the Counter
intelligenoe, Wh11e the o,ther interview involved Lieutenant

Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., tbe top seour1ty offieer tor the
atomio bomb project.
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In sp1 te of the o,r1g1nally stated intentions to conduct
the hearing in the spir1t o,f an inqu1ry--not

B.

trial--one

major or1tlc1sm, dur1ng atld after the proceedings, was the
trial-like techniques and atmosphere which were so prevalent.
-

Roger Robb, chief counsel f.or the boa.rd, frequently used the
techniques of a trial lawyer in his exam1.nation of Oppenheimer
and the witnesses.

Furthermore, Oppenheimer and his counsels

were not allowed to know 1n advance the names of the witnesses
for the board, nor were they g1 ven advance knowledge of docu
mente to be used against Oppenheimer.

7

The trial-like

atmos~

phere is felt in reading the hearing, and certainly must have
been evident in the tone of voice which undoubtedly aooom
panied many of the statements.

On

the seventh day of the

hearing, Garrison pleaded:

I thOUght the notion of an inquiry and not a
trial wae to get at the truth by the shortest
possible route, and it seems to me the attempt
to make a witness seem to be not telling the
truth, or his mernoJi'y is no,t to be relied on
by this board, by the surprise production of
documents, is not the shortest way to arrive
at the truth. It seems to me more Uke a crim
inal trial than it does Uke an 1nq~ry and I
Just regret 1 t has to be done here.'
Again on the eleventh day after the start ot the hearlog, Garrison stated that "The purpose of tb.1s inquiry which

is not a trial 1s to arrive at the truth as nearly as truth

oan be arrived at •• 9

Charles CurtiS, in his analysis ot

the proceed1ngs, concludes however:
On the ",ho le, in api te 0 f Ro'Db, the hearings
were more of an inquin than a trial .•• " They were

less fairly conducted than a good JUdge would
have conducted a tria.l. The Board was always
oourteous and a~waYB dignified, rot dignity
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and courtesy are no sUbstitute for fair dealing.
They do not cure but only palliate unfair prae
tloes. 10
Although Bordon's letter to the F.B.I. stating
derogatory information about Oppenheimer was influential
in lni tiating the proceedings against Oppenheimer, no such

strong accusations were employed 1n the hearing.

The pro

cedures for the hearing, as well as the charges against
Oppenheimer, were stated in General Nichols' well-known
letter.

These charges, which will be considered later,

can be divided into three main categories:

Communism and

SUbversive associates; the Chevaller-Eltenton incident,
involving an attempt to obtain claSSified in1'ormatlon from
Oppenheimer and Oppenheimer's attempt to conceal the true
facts of the incident from the seourity officials; and
thirdly,Oppenheimer's opposition to development of the
Hydrogen Bomb.

The consideration of Oppenheimer's opposition to the
H-Bomb was unfortunate since it involved a Judgment

Oppenheimer t S opinions.

ot

Dr. Vannevar Bush, a prominent

scientist, president of the Carnegie Institution. and an
important figure in national defense and scientific research.
was particularly upset by the que'stlon of Oppenheimer's

oppositi·on.
I feel that the let·tar of General Nichols
which I read ••• 1s quite capable of being inter
preted as p1B.c1ng a man on trial because he
held opinions', wb.1cb ls' qUite contrary to the
American system, which 1s a terrl:ble tMng.
And as I move about I find that discussed today
very energetically. that hera is a man who 18
being pilloried because he had strong opinions.
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and had the temerity to express them.

If'

this country ever gets to the point Where
we come that near to the Russian system,
we are certainly not in any condition to
attempt to lead the
world toward the
benefits of democraoy.

frit

Unfortunately, as Nichola' letter was presented to the
publio in the "New York Times," the section regarding the
H-Bomb question was placed in a separate paragraph, thus
calling more attention to it than was originally 1ntended.
A hot discussion of the issue between Bush and the board

ensued when Bush was called on the 23rd of April to witness.
On the 4th of May, When Bush again testified, the disoovery

of the mistake in paragraphing in the 'ITimes" was brought
into duscuasion.

In spite of the mistake in the newspaper

presentation, Dr. Bush did not feel that he could modify
his previous testimony, and again stated:

"r

realize hoW'

serious a thing it is in this country if the public gets

12

the impression that a man 1s being tried for his op1n1ons." Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias, professor of physics and

dire'ctor of the nuclear science laboratory at M.I.T., added
a touch ot humor to the hearing in his statement "it is a
bit at a p1ty that dueling has gone out of style.

This is

a very d.ef'1n1te method of settling differences of opinion
between people than to try to bring out all the details in
a hearing. n 13
Garr1son gave a further oomment on the structure and
the ee'rlousness· of the proceedings in his summery on the
t1na.l day

0

f the hearing:

There is more than Dr. Oppenhe1mer on tria.l
I use the word "trial. lI adVisedly.
The government of the Unl,ted states is here on
trial also. OUr whole security process is on

in this room.

76
tria.l here, and is in your keeping as is his
llfe--the two things together. There is an
anxiety abroad in the country, and I think I
am at liberty to Bay this to you, because
after all, we are all Americans, we are all
oitizens, and we are all interest.ed here in
doing what is in the public interest, and what
is best for our country .•.. lf we are to be
strong, powerful, electric, and vital, we must
not devour the best and the most gi !ted of our
oitizens in some mechanical apPl1ca!~on of
security procedures and mechanisms.

'CHAPTER

X

OPPENHEIMER - THE MAN

The Oppenheimer hearing is particularly important
and significant due to the prominence of the major figure.
Not only is Oppenheimer a prominent scientist, but also a
lecturer and writer who has contributed much of value to
contemporary thought.

He is indeed probably one of the

great mental geniuses of our time.
Oppenheimer' a Ufe and thought
the type

0

t

In a study of

one can see exemplified

f man that Mr. George F. Kennan, a retired

Foreign Service Officer, spoke of 1n the hearing:
The higher types of knowledge and wisdom

do not often come without very considerable
anguish and o'f'ten a very considerable road

ot-error ••.. when people are, really

glfte~,

those who have what you might oa11 genius,
of some sort, intellectual or artistic, It
1s hard! for them t'o arrange their relat.1on
Shipe to live in ~nor matters and 1¥ a

manner which is wholly conventionAl.

The best chronology and commentary on Oppenheimer's

life 1s written by Oppenheimer himself in hi's rep,ly to
General Nichols, dated March 4, 1954.

2

Additional In1'orma

tlon on his lite, along with trite. commentary, is given b,y

..

Alvin XugeImass in Ms book J. Robert Qppenheimer and the

Atomic StorY, published in 1953. 3

HOt/ever, for the pur-,

poses of this paper the facts as given by

serve

~s

the

m~1n

Oppenhe~er

Source.

Oppenheimer was born in New York Oi ty in 1904 to

1f
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well-to-do Jewish parents.

His father had come to the

United States f'rom Germany when he was 17, while his mother
ws a native of Baltimore.

During his childhood.

Oppenheimer had many cultural and Lntellectual advantages,
including schooling at the Ethical Culture Bchool for
exceptionally brilliant children.

He a.ttended Harvard

Uni versi ty J where he completed his undergraduate work in
1925 and graduated summa cum laude with the highest grades
ever reoorded at Harvard. 4

Following college, Oppenheimer

stUdied in Europe at Cambridge University and at Gottlngen,
wbare he received his dootor's degree in 1927.

After

further study he returned to the United States in 1929 to
acoept teaching positions at the Uriiversity of California
and at the Callfornia Institute of Technology.
years he was actively connected with these
During this period his f'r1ends

Il

For twelve

~stltutlon8.

were for the most part

faculty people, scientists, olassicists, and artists. a5
He read widely, including poetry. plays, classics, and

novels.

He -even studied Sanskr1 t. but was uninterested in

econom1cs or politIcs.

AS Oppe'nheimer stated:

I W$,s almost wholly d1voroed from the
contemporary Bcene in this country. I
never read a newspaper or a C?urrent maga
zine lite T1me or Harper's; I had no radio,
no telephone; I learned ot the stock-market
crack 1n the fall 0 f 1929 only a:rter the
event; the first time I ever' voted was 1n
the presidential election of 1936. To many
of my friends, J1J!1 1ndifference to contem
porary affairs seemed b1zarre, and they
often chided me with being too mueh of a
highbrow. I was 1nterested 1n man and his
experience; I was deeply interested in my
science; but I had no underBtand~ of the
relations of man tOl his society.
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Oppenheimer further stated that beginning in late 1936

his interests 'Degan to change.

He saw the treatment whioh

the Jews, 1.n.oludlng some of hie relatives, were reoeiving
in

Germany, and the effect of the depression on his students.

!hrou8h these oonditi,ons Oppenheimer:

began to understand how deeply political and
economic events could affect men's lives. I
be,gan to feel the n$ed to participate more
tully in tbe lif'e of the oommunity. But I
had no 1'ramewo'rk of polltical conY1ctlon or
exper1en~e to give me perspective in these
matte:t"s .-(

A1so,in 1936, Oppenheimer met Jean Tatlock, the daughter of
a. noted English professor.
to marriage.

At least twice they came close

Through Miss Tatlook, who had joined the

Communist Party from time to time J Oppenheimer made many
"leftwingtl friends, and learned of the Communist Party.

He

became interested in some of the Communist causes and con
tributed money to various oommittees and organizations
Which were intended to help the Communi st-supported Spanish

Loyalist Cause.

He also became involved in several

Comnnmlet front organizations and subscribed to the
Communist newspaper "People I

S

World. It

In 1939, Oppenheimer met his fttture wife, who was then
married to a Dr. Harrison.

She had previously been married

to Joe Dallet. Who was killed while fighting in Spain.
IXlring her brief' marriage to Dallet she, bad been a Communist
Party melilber..

According to the Alsops ~ 'Oppenheimer I s mar

riage in 1940 "Automatioa1ly stimulated much unkindness

1n the BD1811 Be'rkeley oommunity,"1

8

1

8ince Oppenheimer had

le:ft Jean Tatlock. wb11e his future wife hAd d1 vorced her
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husband.

For about two years after his marriage. Oppenheimer

states that he had ""the same cirele of friends" as before.
During this period, Raakon Chevalier and his wife were

partioularly good friends.

Oppenheimer, in his, letter to Nichols. mentioned atten
ding "le'ftwing affairs, II a.nd hie assooiatlollB with several

Communists.

Bec811se of his a.ssociations and his contribt1

tions to Coxnmun.1st causes, Oppenheimer stated that he:
might we 11 have appeared at the time as quite

olose to the Go~st Farty--perhaps even to
some people as belonging to it. As I have
said, Some of' its declared obJeotives seemed
to me desirable. But I never was a member •••.
I never accepted Communist dogma or theory;
Ln fact, it neV$r made sense to me. I had no
clea.rly formuJLated political Views. I hated
tyranny and re,pression and every form of
dictatorisJ.. control of thought. In most cases
I did not in those ~ys know who was andgwho
was not a IneIllber of the Communist Party.
Oppenheimer fUrther stated that by 1943, when he moved to
Los Alamos:

both as a result of my ehanged views and of' the
great pressure ot war work, my participation in
left wing organizations and ~ associations with
lettwing elrcle,s had ceased and weN never to be
reesta.bl1shed.~O

The maJ or events in Oppenheimer' 8 lite :from 1943 until
the hearing have been previously summarized.
Oppenhe.ime'r' s dlfflcul t persona11 ty, whioh the Alsops
think 1s partly responsible for the hearing, is also dis

cussed by Alvin Kuglemass and by Robert Jungt.

Kug1emass

gives an impression Of Oppenhelme,r having a d1,sagreeable
personali ty, which, he 1mplles, in an W11'ortunate way, 1s
characteristic 01 genU!ses in general.

Jungt, in his book
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Brighter than a. Thousand Buns, g1 ves a quotation by one of
Oppenheimer's fonner students to illustrate what he implies
was the general feeling ot scientists toward Oppenhe1mer:
When Oppie started talking about Dean Acheson
as simply 'Dean," and actually referred to General
Harshall, as merely "'George" n I mew that we did
not mo,ve in the same circles any )nora and that we
bad come to the partlng ot the ways. ,I think
that his sudden fame and the new posj:.tion he now
oceupled had gone to his head so much that he
began to oonsider himself' 'God A~1ghty, able to
put the whole world to rights. II
Jungt further states that Oppenheimer felt himself' ato be
12

immeasurably superior, II to his fellow men.

Two further important aspects of Oppenheimer I s person

all ty, both of whioh may have contributed to his downfa.ll,
were his "open mind" philosophy and his loyalty to :friends.
Oppenheimer's "open mind" philosophy which describes his

"nonoommittal attltude,U
alway_s caused him to hesitate, delay and vacillate
so long before tak~ important decisions that he
was driven in the end, either by private ambition
or public pressure, to come to oonclusions, whioh
he almost invariably regretted shortly afterwards. l3
Oppenheimer's vacillation and indeoision on the question

o~

developing the H-Bomb was partioularly critioized in the
hear1ng.
It is surprising, in View

o~ Oppenhe~er's

well known

claxoity of thOUght and expression in public, to rea.d in the

hearing 'transcript "the inarticulate and diffident way in
which Oppenheimer ••• then expressed himself'. n14

At one

point in the proceedings, when Oppenhe1mer entered the heal-
ing room when the, afternoon session was alrea.dy in progress,

Mr. Gray remarked "You are back now, Dr. Oppenhe1mer," to
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which Oppenheimer replled,"Th1s is one of the few things
I

am rea,1.l1 sure of. "15
Oppenheimer's usual clearness and acouracy of thought

was remarked on several times during the hearing.

16

Kennan

in the hearing expresses it thus:
he is a man who when he tums his mind to some

thing in an orderly and responsible way, examines
it with the most extraordinary scrupulousness and
fastidiousness of intellectual process •••• I cannot
oonoeive that in these deliberations in GOvernment
he could have beenspeaklng di s,ingeniously to us
about these matters. I would suppose that you
might just as well have. asked Leonardo da Vinci
to distort an anatomical drawing as that you should
ask Robert Oppenheimer to speak responsibly to the
sort of quesi+ons we vere talking about. and: speak
dishonestly.
.
_
He was partiCUlarly complimented for his accuracy and fair
ness as a committee chairman.
Oppenhe~er

It was generally st.ated that

promoted good discussions, got other members

to express their opinions before he did t and ably summar
ized what the committee members expressed. 1S James Conant,
having stated that Oppenhe1mer was an excellent chairman,

further commented "They were the moet lengthy meetings I
ever sat in on in my life.

They consumed an un-God.ly amount

of time, but they covered the ground f'rom A to Z." l 9
Oppenheimer's loyalty to his f'riends has frequently
been noted, particularly in the major issue of the hearing
wh).eh involved Chevalier.

Oppenheimer tried to protect

Chevalier by not telling security officials that he,
Chevalier, had approached Oppenheimer to try to get informa
tion on the atomic bomb to give to a foreign agent,
20
Eltenton.
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Arthur Compton t in bis book Atomic Quest, speaks

Oppenheimer's loya.lty to bis friends thus:
It Oppenheimer haa an Achilles' heel, it is
his overriding loyalty to his friends. I do not
believe 'that even this loyalty would lead: him
into compromise with treasonable act1 T1 ties. Yet
not even the most brilliant mind oan always see
before too late the d.angers lurking 1n cleTer
wiles t and some ot Oppie t s friends are, or have
been on the Comm~st side ot the line. This
has made it necessary for those in posit1on of
highest :responsibility reluctantly to withdraw
!rom him aocess to our milltary seorets. They
bad to reoognize tba t these personal friendships
and loyalties oould form a channel t~gh which
information might, inadvertently flow. .

ot

CHAPTER XI
OPPENHEIMER - JUS THOUGHTS

A study of Oppenheimer's lectures and writings on
topios dealing with the relationship of scienoe to sooiety
and the problems of the atomio age. give insight to his

actions preceding the heariDg and to his testimony throUgh
out the hearing.

One should notice particularly his two

major important concepts whioh pervade his speaking, and
form an integral part ot his life.

These are the concepts

of an "open m.1nd," and a common understanding ot science.
The

~open

mind" of whioh Oppenheimer speaks. is one

whioh 1s free to discuss, exchange ideas, and make evalua
tions on the basis of all the facts.

It is a mind which

is receptive to new ideas and to change.

Moreover,

Oppenheimer states,
an ind1spensable ••• element in giving meaning to
the dignity of men, and in making possible the

taking of decision on the basis, ot honest. oonvic
tion, 1s the openness of men IS minds" and the

openness of whatever media there are for commun
ication between men, free of. restraint, free of

repress1on, and free even ot that most perva&ive
res~ra~ts, that of status and of'
hierarchy.

ot all

Oppenheimer has

e~reBsed

concern about the changed

rela.tionship of science and the society and a.bout the gap
mi,ch ha·B developed between the eo.ient1st and the layman.

In the past, Oppenheimer points out:
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there were many men who were able to combine
in the1r own lives the aotivities of a scien
t.ist with aotivities ot art and learning and
politics, and were able to carry over from the
one into the other this combination of courage
and modesty which 1s the lesson sc1enoe always
tries to teaoh anyone who practices it. 2
Oppenheimer :further stresses that
Today the scientist is not in society; ...
O~ course, he does get paid. he does get
patronized and e"en for odd! reasons that he
does not understand, ,respected. But he 1s
not in society. in the sense that 'the ideas
he has, the work he 1 s doing, st,op rea1.ly
rather short With the l1.m1ta of profession.
They are not part of th.,e 1nt.ellectual and
,
cultural life of the times. 3

Oppenhe1mer continues that it is odd, in a world whioh is
so deeply affected by scienoe and which has in the past

been so influenced by sc1entific thought, that the scien
tist should be so remote from soc1ety.

Today we live

in a world 1n which poets and historians and
men o't affaire are proud that they wouldn t t
even begin to consider thinking about learn
ing anything or scienoe. regarding it as the
tar end of a turmel ttO long for any wise man
to put his head into.

The life of the soientist 1s now centered in a
COTDJIDm1 ty"

n sc1entltlc

which has many of the functions previously at

Within the soient1fic

tributed to society as a Whole.

conumm'ty there is common understanding. discussion, freedom
of thought, and cooperation.

"In his own line of work he

11ves in a community 'Where common understanding combines
with common purpose and interest to bind men together both

-

1n freedom and in cooperation.-

5

In this scientific .atmos

phere
a Bc1,entist takes h1s colleagues as Judges,
competltors and collaborators. That does
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not mean, of course, that he loves his
colleagues; but it gives him a way of
llvlng6with them ••• in the contemporary
world.
According to Oppenheimer, the separation of science from
the total culture 1s an inevitable result of scientific
progress.

Science, more than other fields such as liter

ature, depends on an accumulation

or

past knowledge.

Use 1s made of earlier work 1n soience as
When we find out
something new about the natural world this
does not superse~e what we knew before; it
transcends it ••.
an instrument of progress.

During the rapid scientific progress which has occurred in

this oentury) great advancements have been made in the spec
ialization of science.

New specialized vocabularies and

thoUght have developed too rapidly to keep pace with the
oommon understanding.

Oppenheimer has aptly said, "We know

too much for one man to know much."

In order to lessen the

gap between science and society it is, however, the duty
of scientists to convey the meanings and findings of science
to society.8

Even though scientists "have a responsibility

for the communjcation of the truths they have found,"9 they
must not let society lose sight of the methods of Bcienoe,
including the "tuJDbl1Dg, tentative efforts which lead toll
a scientific theory.lO

Science cannot be taken for granted in a society.

In

areas of the world where war and terror rule the "very
foundations" of science have been corrupted, with the result
that
even the traditional fraternity of scientists
has not proved adequate pro,tection against
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decay .•.. Tyranny, when it gets to be absolute,
or when it tends so to become, finds it impos
sible to continue to live with science. II
Oppenheimer furthe,r states that:

It i8 possible, manifestly, for society so to
arrange things that there i8 no science . The
Nazis made a. good start in that direction;
maybe the communists will aohieve it; and
there is not one of us free of worry that this
f1our~h1ng tree may some day not be aUve 8J1y
mo,re .
For science to flourish in a society there

~at

be freedom

of thought. oommunication, and oriticism.

As in political

life, actions and thoughts must be scrutinized since

we do not bellev,s any group o,f men adequate
enough or wise enough to aot without scrutiny
or without critioism. We know that the only
way to avo1d error 16 to detect it, that the
only way to detect it is to be free to inquire.
We 1010\>1 that the wages ot secrecy are corrup
tion. We know that in secrecy !!ror, undetec
ted, Will flourish and subvert.
As one would expect t Oppenheimer has wrlt ten and lec
tured extensively on atomio energy and its pla.ce in the
contemporary liorld.

Even though scientists' opinions have

played relatively little part in the a.ctual use of atomic
weapons, scientists cannot divoroe themselves from the fact
t:\1at they are responsible for the release of atomio energy.
They feel that they tlshould assume the res:POnslbility for
14
the fI'Uits ll of their wort.
Oppenheimer sums up his view
on atomic energy thus:

"There is only one future of atomic

explosives that I can regard with any enthusiasm:

that

they should never be used in war."15
Since the first atomic explosion, the hope has been
pre"lfalent that the terror of atom1c warfare will bring an
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end to wa.r.

However, Oppenheimer maintains:

it would not even be honest to say that beca.use
of this terror the aboUtlon of war and the
maintenance of peace have become the one a.bsolute
fina.l objective ot all Vo11tlcal decis1ons. There
are other things in man s llte--his freedom, h.1s
decency, his sense of right and wrong--t~~t oa:rm.ot
eo l1ghtly be sUbjected to a single end.
Oppenheimer agrees with the ,statement tha,t many have made:
IIwtthout world government there can be no perman3t 'peace,
and without peaoe there will be atom1c warfare. II

Only

17

through international control can rivalry be elim1nated
and atomio energy developed for peaoeful purposes.

Unfor

tunately such control is no simple procedure:
We see no clear course before us that would

persuade the gpvernments of the world to Join
wi th us 1n creating a more, and more open ~lOrld,
and thUs to establish the foundations on wh1ch
persuasiQn might 80' largely~replace coercion in
determining human a'ff'alrs. liS
For the formation of atomic

weapon~~

pollcy in the

United States Oppenhetmer feels "the greatest attainable
freedom of aotion" is neoessary.19
lnf'ormed on the progress

0

One must be well

f atomic energy and the current

policy regarding it in order to negotiate effectively with
foreign powers if the opportunity should ariee. 20

further

more> "oandor on the part of the officials Of the United
States .government

~o

the officials, the representatives,

(andJ the people of the'lr country" is necessary.

Only when

are known Without secrecy and fear can wise deei
s10ns be made. 21

the fact,s

Oppenheimer is disturbed by the inaocurate and ineom
plete information which the publlc

arms race.

IIA

~celves

about the atomio

great deal. of deta.iled information, some true,

and much largely fa.lse, n has been publicly published.
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"This mass of published rumor, fact, press release and speo
ulation, could yield, upon analysis, a fairly solid oore of

truth; but as it stands, it 18 not the truth. n22 Such false
reports and concepts result when only part of the facts are

known.
'!'he political vitality of our country depends largely,
according to Oppenheimer, on conflict of

op~on

and debate

in the government and on "public opinion which is based on

confidence that it knows the truth." 23

However, the opin

ion of responsible citizens does not exist if they believe
IIthat there 1s somebody else who knows the truth" wb.1oh is
not generally ava11able. 24 It 1s evident that as long as
there 1s danger of war there will be secrets whioh must
remain confldential. 25

However, there are certain areas

regarding the "characteristics and probabl,! effects of our
atomic weapons," which Oppenheimer feels should not rem.a1n
seoret.

The general publlc should be infonned of such

things as

II

in rough terms--the numbers tot weapons] avail

able and of the changes that are likely to occur in the next
few years •..• and our general estimate of where the enemy
stands .,,26

It has been argued that euch a procedure would

g1 ve vi tal in10rmation to the enemy.

However, 1t seems

likely to Oppenheimer that the enemy already has such 1nfo)"m
at1on.

nIt is available to anyone who Will trouble to make

an intelligent analysis of what has been published.

Private

01 tizens do not do this; but we must expect that the enemy

does.

1f27

Moreover,he feels that it is Itimportant for the

peace of the world if the enemy knows these basic facts. "28
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From this brief study of Oppenheimer' B thought one

should easily see how auch

t~ing

is frequently incompat

ible with security requirements and, in part, why the majority
of the Gray Board and the Atomic Energy' Commission felt 1 t

necessary to deny hLm clearance.

CHAPTER XII
LOS ALAMOS AND SECURITY

At the time of the security

hea~,

Oppenheimer was

Director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton,
New Jersey.

Seourity clearanoe was necessary so that he

could also serve as an advisor to the government on scien
tific matters.

However, the evidenoe used in the hearing

was derived primarily from his early teaching days, start

ing about 1929, and was focused on the aotive period of
the atomic bomb laboratory at Los Alamos, New Me xi 00 •

The

following years from October 1945 when he lett Los Alamos,
to the hearing in April 1954, played 11 ttle part in the
consideration of his loyalty and possession of classified

material.
In the hearing particular oonsideration is given to the

history of Los Alamos--the selection of its site, ita seolu
sion, its stafr and director, the security measures, and
the working condi tiona present.

In 1942, the site tor the

atomlc bomb laboratory was selected by Oppenheimer in a
remote section of New :Mexico.

After approval of the site

by General Groves of the Manhattan Engineer District, the

construction of the immense laboratory progressed rapidly.
In 1943, Oppenheimer was given seourity c1earanoe and was
appointed head of the new laboratory.

At this time. the

facts of Oppenheimer's past associations and his contacts
-9-1
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wi th Communi am were recorded in the F. B. I. files and were

considered in the clearance procedures.

In spite of this

dubious record he was given clearance.

The desert wilderness was selected by Oppenheimer
particularly for its seclusion, Which would lead to greater
ohances for security.

The scientists in the laboratory

were to form an isolated community, free from contacts with
the outside world.

The prospeot of liVing under such bleak

oond1tiona for an undetermined period oreated a problem in
bringing responsible scientists to Los Alamos.

As Oppen

heimer wrote in his letter to General Nichols:
I had to rely on their sense of interest,
urgenoy, and feasibility of the Los Alamos
mission. I had to tell them enough of What
the job waa, and give enough assurance that
it migb.t be successfully accolDPl1shed in time
to affect the outcome of the war, to make it
clear that they were justified in their leav
ing other work to come to this job••.• ['Los
Alamo sJ was to be a m11itary po at; men were
asked to sign up lIlore or less- for the dura
tion; restrictions on travel
on the free
dom of families to 'move about were to be
severe; and no one could be sure or the extent
to which the necessary teohnical freedom of
action could actually be maintained by the
labora,tory. The notion of disappearing into
the New MeXico desert for an 1ndete~inate
period and under quasi military auspices dis
turbed a good many scientists, and the famil
ies of many more .••• ~ost everyone real1zed
that this was a great Wldertaking .••. This
sense of excitement. of devotion and ot pat.
riotlsm in the end prevailed.

and

The responsibil1ty of recruit'ing men for the new project
was left. to Oppenheimer.

He had to select men With the pro

per talents and training and persuade them to enter into the
enterpl'ise.

In this selection, according to Oppenheimer,

Upast Communist connections or sympathies did not necessarily
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disqualify a man from employment, if we had oonf1dence 10
.
n2
his Integr1ty and dependabil1 ty as a man.
Oppenheimer
in the hearing spoke of his scientists thus:

they were a

large group of brilliant ind1V1duallst1c and
talented people in harmony and pulling on the
same team. We had people there who we,re
refugees from G$rmany and Italy. We had Eng
lishmen, we had Iota of Americans. 3t was in
a tmmy wayan international efto,rt.

The months of intensive atomic research cuJm1nated in
the first 'atomic blast, on the A.E.C. testing ground in
New Mexioo.

The .eminently successful blast exceeded the

expectations of any of the preVious reports by the bomb
dave,lopers.

After the success of the atomic bomb with the

resulting rapid end of the war I many of the scientists :tel t
that their work a.t Los A1amoe had finished.

Like the flght-

Ing soldiers, they were anxious to leave the war work and

return to their civilian lives.
In the hearing there are conflicting op1n10nB about

Oppenhe1mer's attempts to keep the laboratory active and to
persuade the scientists to continue with atomic development
at Loa Alamos. 4 Ha.ny of the soientists did return to their
oivilian wo,rk in basic research;

howeve~

many others remained

at Los Alsmos, so the laboratory did not completely disinte
grate.

Oppenheimer remained a.t Los Alamos tor three months

atter the official end of the, war.

However t he felt that

sinoe he had 'been called to the laboratory as war time direc
tor he should return to teaohing a:rter the emergency was

,over.

After a sui table new director for the la.boratory had

been found, Oppenheimer felt fi'ee to resign. 5
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The methods for security protection a.t Los Alamos were
important and controversial issues.

The deserted location

of the laboratory and the usual physical proteotions of
barbed wire fences and gua.rds were of course primary in the
secur1ty measures.

However, there was also the human side

of security measures involVing the scientists and their
familiee.

During the first day of the hearing Oppenheimer

explained some of the security precautions as follows:
We, .communicated very sparingly and through
quite restricted external channels with other
parts of the Manhattan District ..... We had some
really fantastic secu~ty provisions. .They
were not 1n the end effect!va as we know.
Familiee were supposed to come with their hus
bands if they wanted to, but they were not
allowed to leave •••• We had all our phone calls
mon!tored. It was illegal to ma11 tI. lett.er
exoept in the authorized drops and ingolng and
out.going mail was censored.
OUr names were not known and our drivera I
licenses were all made out under fict.itious or
artificial names •••. We went to precaut10DB
which did not do t.he trick, ~t which looked
very formidable at the time.
Oppenheimer further said that as the director of the labor
atory he "had partly the job of devising these idiotic
things and partly the job of making them welcome."7
Compartmentallzation was a major problem in the olash
of scientists with military men.
mark of secur1ty 1s secrecy.

To the military man a

J. grea.ter degree of security

should therefore be obtained by diViding the project into
small segments, each working on a separate part of the total
p;ro ject J and each segment not knowing what the others a.re
working on or a.ccomplishing.

Such a s.ystem of compartmental

iza.tion presents obvious drawbacks to the sc1entists.

There

9$
oan be no sense of direction in the work--no pride in a
segment of work which cannot be linked to a greater and
vastly important whole.

Moreover. there is needless repet

ition of work involving even the simplest basic aspeots ot
the research. while the basic need for freedom ot commun
ication which is so essential to the scientist is stifled
by compartmentalization.
In hie investigations of the atomic problem before the

decision to establish Loa Alamos, Oppenhe.tmer had seen the
adverse results of compartmentalization as a aeeurity mea
sure.

There~ore.

as he, stated in the hearing. a.t the time

of founding Los Alamos
we had a general notion ••• that all the work of the
laboratory would be open to all the sc1entifio
members of the laboratory. This 1s a. matter which
General Groves, I think, concurred in. bUt tdltch
he never entirely liked. In other wordLs, within
the 1aboratory the competent people were supposed
to know What the story was. It turned out over
a.."ld over again th1$ was a wise polic'y. Good ideas
came from places that you would not have expeoted.
Enthusiasm and understanding could be gene§ated
because people knew what it '118.8 all about~
The scientist. Dr. Norman Ramsey, Jr. of Harvard;

stated his view on oompartmentalizat10n at Los Alamos thus:

FoX' the bas10 scient1fio developments, there
was very little compartmentalization for very
good reasons •••• It had been discovered quite
early in the war ••• tha.t inefflclen,cy went up
very rapidly with excessive compartmental1zatl.on.
Actually at Los Alamos my own g~ouP. being some
what more over the direct scientific developments
and a.1s'0 being considered one of the most top
secret things ..• were· to a considera.ble degree
compartmentalized. That 1s. we were never 1n
vited to give re p or B at the staff seminars on
What we were doing.

9

Statements by other scientists indicate that many of them
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were more bothered by compartmentalization than was Ramsey.
The 'head o..t the atomic projeot f General Groves, as well

as other non-scientists, was not in complete agreement with

the scientist.s I desire for the breakdown of compartmental
izat10n in the. atomic dev:elopment.

Groves stated:

I coUld never lnElke up my own mind as to whether
Dr. Oppenheimer was the one who was pr1marily at
fault in breaking up the compartment$.llzation •..•
I don t t to tb1s day ]mo,w whether 1 t Was' wise. I
think it was a ser10us· mistake and felt so at the
time to have the laok of compartmentalization go
on down the line. In other words, it was all right
to have the leaders, maybe 20 to 30, but not to
have as many men as ~~ permitted to break down
oompartmentalization.
Fortunately for the laboratory, General Groves had an

amazing balance between mill tary procedures and respect for
the soientist.

Groves was aware of the 8i tuation Which

eXisted and did not treat the scientist's attitude as a
personal insult.

As he said in the hearing:

The academic scientists were not 10 sympathy
with cOlflpartmenta.Uz·a.tion. They were not in s;rm
patby' with the security requirements. They fe·It
that they were UDreasonable. I nevE;lr held this
against them, because I knew that their Whole
l1ves ••• hti.d been based on the dissem1na:tio.n o"f
knowledge. Here, to be put in a strange envlJ'On
ment where the requ1re-ment was not dissetUnation J
but not talk1ng a.bout 1 t J was a. terrible upset.
'They were constantly under pressure f'rom their
tellows in every direction to break down cODlpart
menta.lizat1on. While I was always on the other
side of the fence t I was never surpr1sed wheIl!
one of them broke the rules. J:.~
Groves

real1·~ed

what a touchy 81 tuat10n he had to handle

W1th the sclEmtists.

If one

ot them should

be asked to

leave because of security measures, he realized the effect

wbloh this would have on the attitude of the scientific
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ooIDlllUJl1ty. re,sult1ng in stopping or slowing down the work
for as much as a year or six months. 12

Pr., Arthur Compton, who worked closely with Groves on
the atomic proJect, ,said the following about Groves in his

book Atomic Quest:
:rhe nation was fortunate indeed 1t1 the selec
tion of General Groves ••.• A (1evoted serve.nt of
his country. a man or brilliant mind, un] 1 m1 ted
oourage, and tireless energy, he waa a skilled
and able" though not always smooth, adm1Idstrator •
•••A handlcap ••• wss his unramillar1ty' with 801
e,ntists. their moti vat 1 on's , and their way of
tb1nk1ng. This occasionally led to misunderst,and.
lng, W1th the men With whom mutual confidenoe was
mos,t essential. But such mls,understand1ngs were
in large measure offset by his respect for What
the scientists were aocompllshing, and was DlU'ch
more than counterbalanced by his OVIl understsnd
1ng of what 1s requ,1red to make a great enterprise
bring results. Especially important was his abl1...
tty to overlook irrelevant perso,nal tra,1ts and to
select men on
basis only of the1r competenoe
and loyalty ••• 3

the

Important in the hearing is the question in the A.E.C.

IS

criteria for jUdging clearance eligibility regard1.ng the
ba.lance of possible risk involved 1n employing an indiv
idual with his value to atom1c development.

Such a question

of 'balance led to many' interpretations of nega.tive and posi
t! ve va.lue s •

Mr. J obn M.oCloy. :former cOilSUlltent to the

Secretary of War. stressed the necessity of taking calcul
ated risks to ge,t good men. 14 Hany of the best scientists
do1Ilg war lrork were Germans W1th suspicious backgrounds.

This is not ot course the ideal situation for seoret work,
but as !-icCloy pointed out,

tIl

suppose yoU would like to

have a perfectly' pure t uncontaminated chap, with no back
ground, to dea.l with these things, blt it is not possible
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in this world. 1115

The problem of promoting security by restricting

publ1eation of scientific fin d1 ngs was also discussed in
the hearing.

A strong tendency was noted among government

officials to prohibl t publication of

connected with atomic energy.

~

area even remotely

Scientists Jon the other hand I

feeling that such restrictions severely hampered scientifio
development, advocated less classification.

Generally,

they agreed that certain m1.l1tary aspects should not be
published, but that apart trom these areas they should

publish frealy.16

CHAPTER XIII
CONSIDERATIONS OF SOIENTIFIC

IN THE' HEARING

PERSO~TIES

Consideration of scientific personalities takes a
prominent and interesting part in the hearing.

It was

important for the defense to give the non-scientifio mem
bers of the board a feeling of the basic qualities of the
scientifio

~d

and personality, along with a feeling for

the atmosphere in which the scientist must work and how
this is incompa.tible

Wi tb

security regulations.

In addi

tion to serious testimony on the above considerations,
Dr. Ward V. Evans J the onJ.y sclenti st on the board, added

a light touch in his questioning of the witnesses on the
sclentific mind.

Dr. Evans seemed to take an amused

attitude about the common conception of the scientist.
Since Evans 1s a scientist, he was in the position to
ridicule his colleagues in a manner which would have been
insulting if done by a non-scientist.
The discussions in the hearing

1nvol~

the charao

teristios of scientists show an interesting contrast between
two securit,Y officials, While at the same t1m~,;:<e.dd to the

princ1pal considerations of scientists.

The two officials,

General Groves and Colonel John Lansdale, reveal their two
different personalities when discussing their impressions
of sc1ent1.sts.

Groves eXh1 bi ted a sensi tlve understanding
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of scientists, bOth a.t work and in their personal lives.
In contrast. Lansdale, warttme senior security officer for
the atomic bomb project. exhibited an attitude of bitter
self'-jostif'lcatlon.

A few quotes by these men illustrate

their personal1ties, in addition to giving insight to the
scientist's position in wartime research.

General Groves,

speaking from his experience as head of the atomio projeot
stated:
Wh1~e I may have dominated the s1tuatlon in
general, I didn I t have uty own way in a lot of
things. So when I say tha. t Dr. -Oppenheimer did
not always kee'p the fa! th with res.pect to the
strict interpretation of the security ,rules, if
I could say that he was no worse than any of my
other leading sc1entists, I think that would be
a fair- statement. l.t would not be right to say
that he observed myseeurity rules to the letter,
because while I have no evidenoe of his violating
them--af'ter all, I am not stupid--I know he did •.••
I can t t recal~ a case whe,re he dell be rately
violated my secunty instruotions. That 1s dif
ferent from v10lating what he knew I would want .
• • • They (the seientlsts, engineers, and mill
tary men] were the kind of men I wanted" and
they were the k1-nd of men that made the projeot
a suo cess. I r I had a grou~ of yes lnen we never
would hava gotten anywhere.

Lansdale, from bis experience 'as a security offioer,
stated in 'oontrast:
The scientists en mass presentea. an extremely
difficult .problem. The' reason for it. as near
as I ea.n ,3.udge, 1s that with oerta.in outstanding
exoeptions they lacked What I oalled breadth.
They' were extremely oompetent in their field but
their extreme competence in their chosen field
led them falsely to belie'va that they were as
competent 1n any other field.
The result when you got them together was to
make administration pretty difficult because
eaoh one thOUght that he could adm1n1ster the
adm1n1atrati ve aspeots of the amy' post better
than any Army offioer, for example, and didn't
hesitate to say so with respeot to any detall of'
llving or detail of se-our1ty or anything else.
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I hope my soientist friends will forgive me,
but the veU nature of them made things pretty

diftlcult. 2

FUrthermore, when being questioned by Mr., Robb, counsel for
\

the boa.rd, on the 11e which Oppenheimer told in connection
wi th the Cheva.ller-Eltenton incident, and was asked if

lying is a. oh.aracteristic of scientists, Lansdale replied:

I don't think persons as a. group are lia.rs.
I certainly can't. overemphasize, however, the
extremely frustrating, almost mactening, let me
say, tendency of our more brilliant people to
extend in their own mind their competence and
independence of dec sion in fields in which they
have no comPetence.

3

When asked by Dr. Evans liDo you a.s a rule dislike the scien

tific mind?

Is i t a peculiar thing? II

Lansdale replied.

"I will say this, that during the war I came very strongly
to dislike the characteristics which it exhibited. 114

The Oppenheimer hearing contains many incidents to
illustrate the incompatt.bil1ty of the personality of the
scientist with government security regulations.

The scien

tist must be tree from restraints, both physical and mental.

He must be free to think, exchange knowledge, question,
doubt, and aot.

He must be tree to see all parts of a

scientific endeavor that have been explored, and free to do
what is interesting and vital to him.

Too frequently, in

view of the above characteristics, the human side of the
scientist is forgotten.

The scientist must be treated as

human and 81ven the dignity and respect due to such
member

0

f so ciety •

B.

vital

The Oppenheimer hearing, parti cu1arly

the statements made by-'-Lansdale, do not ::ProDlote such respeot.
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It is ditticult tor a good scientist to restrict his
Bcientific characteristics to the laboratory.

In general,

the scientist cannot have a Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde personality.
To be a whole, well integrated and mentally healthy ind.1v
idual,he must be the same person both within the laboratory
and in the general Boo.1ety.

According to the testimony or

Mr. Harry Alonso Winne, Chairman of the Defense Department t s

panel on atomic energy, the "inquiring type ot mind," which
is livery curious about everything, II might, as one would
expect, be interested in attending
talking With Communists. 5

Co~st

meetings and

It is difficult to quell the

scientist's need to communicate, whether with subversives
or "loyal people," on secret issues or ones for general
knowledge.

It 1s indeed often difficult to know Who is

subversive or what areas should remain secret.

The truly creative scientist generally prefers basic

researoh and the exploration of properties of the physical
world for -their own value, rather than the more cUctatorial
science involved in working for a fixed goal as is done 1n
most research for the government.

The scientist's desire to

leave the bo.mb work after the war and get back to basic
research is noted several times 10 the hearing.

Even within

the bomb work there was a tendency to consider it as a basic
research problem Which was adding to their basic knowledge

of the physical universe, rather than as the creation of a
bomb powerful enough to quickly end the war.

This uquirk ll

ot the scientific mind is evidently difficult for the layman
to underatand, as exemp11f1ed 1n the cro,ss exam1 na.tion of
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Oppenheimer by Mr. Robb on the topic of the atomic bomb work.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q_.

• •• were you au f'fering f'rom or deterred by
any moral scruples or qualms about the
development of this wea:gon?
Of oourse.
You we·re?
Of course.
But you still got on with the wo.rk, didn't

you?
A.

Yes,· because this was a \fork of explora"tion.
It was not the preparation o,! a weapon.
Q.' You mean it was jus.t an academic excursion?
A. It was an attempt at finding out 'ilha:t things
could be done.
Q..
But you were going to spend millions ,of' dollars
of the taxpayers' money on it weren't you?
A. It goes on all the time.
Q.
Were you going to spend! m11110ns i ! not billions
ot dollars •• ~ just to· tind out for your own
sat1.ataetion ,dlat was going on?
A. We spent no auch sums.
Q.
Did you propo'se to spen'a any such sum·s, for a
mere academic excursion?
A. No. It is no,t an academic tMng whether you
can make a by~gen bomb. It ls a matte'r of
life and death.
The testimony of two men, Mr. George F. Kennan and

Dr. Norris Bradbury, gives further consideration to the
personality of scientlsts.

Mr. Kennan, a retired Foreign

Service Officer, testified as follows:
••• 1 think you stated in effect, or at
least you 1mplied that all gified in
dividuals were more or lees screwballs.
The Witness: Let me eay the.t they are s.pt to be, it

Dr~

Evans:

I

may.

Would you. say that a large pero'8ntage
of them are?
The Witness: No,. ,sir; I would not say that they are
screwballs, but I \"lOuld say that when
gifted 1ndi"'1iduals come to a ma.turi ty
of JUdgment whioh makes them valuable
public servants, you are apt to find
that the road by whioh they h.a;ve ap
proached that has not been as regula.r
as the road by which other people
have approached 1 t . It may have had
Zigzags in it o~ various sorts.
Dr. Evans :

J.04
Dr. Evans:

Mr. Gray:

Dr. Evans:
Mr. Gray:

I tlUnk 1 t would be borne out 1n the
literature. I believe it was Addison,
and someone correct me if I am wrong,
that said, "Great \'lite are near to
madness, close allies and thin parti
tions do their bounds d1 vide. "
Dr. Oppenheimer is smiling. He knows
whether I am right or wrong on that.
that is all.
YLr. Kennan, you certa1nly would not be
prepared to testify that all scientists
are screwba.lls, would you?
I am worried about that, becauee it has
been brought up a. or 3 t.1mes. I am
getting a little sore about lt~
One further serious question. These
g1 fted people about whom there has been
a very considerable discussion here, as
you say, in many oases arrived at jUdg
ments, attitudes, convictions after all
sorts o! experience. You tee 1, however,
that the unusual person or gifted person
who has traveled perhaps a dl fferent
road than most other people can at one
point rea.ch. e. stability on the basis of
which there can be absolute predictabl1
i ty as to no ~rther exC1Aions?

The Witness: Let me say at a. point where there can be
sufflclent predictability to warrant
his being accepted ~y the government
for public service.
Later in the heari.ng Dr. Bradbury, who succeeded Oppenheimer
as director of the laboratory, was questioned on the same
topic:
Dr. Evans:

Do you thi.n..lr that scientific men as a rule
are rather peculiar individuals?
The Witness: When did I stop beating my wife? ..
Scientists are human beings. I think as
a class, because their basic task is
concerned with the exploration ot the
facts of nature, understanding, this 1s
a quality of mind philosophy--a scientist
wanta to know correctly and truthfully
a.nd prec1sely. By thi s token it seems
to me he is more likely than not to be
interested in a number or fields, but to
be interested in them from the p01nt of
view of exploration. What is in them?
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What do they have to offer? Wha.t is
the1r truth? I th1nk this degree of
flexibility of approach, of interest,
of curiosity about facts, about systems,
about life J 1s an essentj.al ingredient
to a man who is going to be a success~
ful research sc1entist. If he does not
have this underlying curiosity, willing...
ness to look into things, wish and
desire to look into things, I do not
t~ he will be either a good or cer
tainly not a great scientist.
Therefore, I think you are llkely to
find among people who have imag1.native
minds in the scientific field, ind1v~
idua,1.s who are also willing, eager to
look at a number of other fields with
the same type of interest, willlngness
t.o examine J to be convinced and Without
a. prior conviction as to rightness or
wrongness, that 1b1s constant or this
or that curve or this or that f'unction
is :fatal.
I thillk the same sort of 111111 ngness
to explore other areas of human activity
1s probably characteristic. If this
makes them peculiar, I think it
probably a desirable peeularlty.

as

The difficult task of integrating the individuallstic

atomic scientists into a unified and wo,rking program for
war' research was the responsibIlity of both scientists and

government of'f'1cials.

Acoording to Dr. Hans Bathe, Who

worked at Los Alamos dUring the war, Oppenheimer served as
that lIunifylng force" in his laboratory.

Such a task " could

only be done by a man Who really understood everything and
was recognized by everybody as superior in jUdgment. and
superior in knowledge to all of'

US. 119

The following conversation taken from the transcript of
Lansdale's interview with Oppenheimer involves Oppenheimer's
position as a "unifying force. II
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L. : I know of course, that you probably have aAm1D

lstratively the best ~Jnn'ng outfit 1n the
project, and tnat it's largely because of the
intense personal loyalty which you seem to be
able to inculcate 1n the people that work for
you.
o. : I have my troubles.
I can see one ot
L: Yes, I can imagine you do.
the reasons for it--they stiok by you and you
stick by them, Which at'ter all 1s the secret
of obtaining people's t8Ya1ty.
o. : I do have my troubles.

The soientist's conscience relating to atomic devel
opment is considered several times in the hearing.

That

ls, whether the scientist could, or should, work on suoh
potentially destructl f t weapons as the atomic and hydrogen
bombs Without considering the moral or e:tthical implioa
tions.

Three aspects of this problem were discussed:

should the scientist create such a destructive force; if
he does create 1t should it be used to destroy life; and
how much responsibility does the scientist have 1n advising
the government on its use.
Dr. Wendell Mitchell Latimer, professor of chemistry

at the University of California, was asked by Mr. Silverman,
a counselor for Oppenheimer, "Wasn't it true that many
scientists after the explosion at Hirosh1ma ••• were terribly
troubled by this weapon?"

He was also asked if he was

"troubled by the faat that 70,000 people were killed at
Hiroshima" II

Lat1mer repl1ed that the atomio bombs might

have saved lives by bringing an end to the war, and that
he was troUbled by 1t to the same Bttent as he was by the
fire bombs over Tokyo.
troubled by war

'~n

He stated further that he was

,general,tI but admitted that "the men
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who had worked on the bomb might have been troubled more
aoutely."11

Dr. Luis Walter Alvarez, speaking as a scien

tist, said that he never had a:ny "moral scruples tl about
working on the atomic bomb t feeling that it had saved more
lives than it had destroyed. 12

He could not agree with

Oppenheimer in the desire not to build the super bomb, in
the fear of having Russia surpass us in development of the
advanoed weapon .13

Dr. Bethe, on the other hB.nd, was not

as sure that he had done the right thing in working on the
thermonuclear program:
I am afraid my inner troubles stayed with me and
are still with me, and I have not resolved this
problem. I still feel that maybe I have done the
wrong thing in helping to create a still more
formidable weapon, ~~aU8e I don't t~ it solves
any of our problems.
Dr. Oppenheimer was also not clear in his mind on the

moral questions of the bomb development.

It is this inde

oision on the development of the hydrogen bomb which is
played up bw the anti-Oppenheimer faction as a sign of his
disloyalty.

The main issue against Oppenheimer on the ques

tion of the H-bomb development was that he failed to take a
fixed opinion on one side or the other.

Th.1s is a prime

example of difficulties oaused by his "open mind" philosophy.
The 1nvolvlnent

0

f Opnenheimar 's oonscience wi th mat ~ ng a

decision on the H-bomb is shown in the following passages.
On the second day of the hearing Oppenheimer stated) III

think it is very clear that the objection was that

we

did

not like the weapon, not that it couldn't be made.,·15

Later in the hearing Mr. Robb pursued the topi,c further in
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a. cross-examination of Oppenheimer:

Q..

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Did you sUbsequent to the President's decision
in January 1950 ever express any opposition to
the production of the hydrogen bomb on moral
grounds?
I would think that I could very well have said
this 1s a dreadful weapon, or something like
that .•• I have always thOUght it was a dread
ful wea.pon •..
You mean you had a moral revulsion against the
production of such a. dreadful weapon?
That 1s too strong ...•
Which is too strong, the weapon or my expression?
Your expression. I had a grave concem and
anxiety.
You bad moral qualIns about 1 t, 1s that accurate?
Let us leave the word "moral n out o:t 1 t .
You had qualms about it?
How could one not have qualms about 1 t? I !g0w
of no one who doesn't have qualms about it. 1

Near the conclusion of the hearing when asked about making
announcement on the United States' policy toward the use
of atomic weapons against Russia, Oppenheimer replied:
In the 9 years we have been talking about these
things I have said almost everything on almost every
side of every question. I take it you are asking
whether in some official document I uneqUivocally
recommended that we make a public pronouncement of
our policy With regard to this, and to ihat my
best and fairly certa.1n answer is "no . It 1

Conaideration of the scientist's conscience was
pertinent in the discussions on the duties of the scientist
as an advisor for the government.

It was unclear to scien

tlsts and government men alike, Whether the scientist should
restrict his advice to purely technioal aspects or whether
he should let moral questions govern his opinions.

In

broad terms OppenheiMer stated the s·cientlst' s duty thus:

It is his responsibility "to
going

On and what

~ell

what he knows of what 18

he knows ot the truth."18

When ques
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tloned by Mr. Robb

1f • • •

I wish you would tell us why you

relt it was your function

QS

a scientist to express views

on mill tary strategy and tactics. II
ttl felt

J

Oppenheimer replied t

perhaps quite strongly, that having played an

act1ve part in promoting a revo lUtlon in warf'are

J

I needed

to be as responsible as I could with regard to what came
of this revolution. II

In the course of the hearing the defense directed
its questioning so that the board could become closely
acquainted with Oppenheimer as a man, and could understand
his motives, thoughts, and actions.

Indeed after closely

reading the hearing one does feel suoh an acquaintance with
Oppenheimer.

Apropos of such a pUrpose, Mr. Garrison said

in his statement at the end of the hearing that we must
know the man in order to jUdge him.
testified for

~

The scientists Who

knew him; they had worked and lived with

him; they were able to jUdge. 19

CHAPTER XIV

QUESTIONS AND DECISIONS
The ultimate question in the hearing, whether Oppen
heimer should be gi van seourity clearanoe and thereby
allowed access to classified information, was based on
three major issues.

The issues were his associations with

Comw 1n 1sts and the Communist Party; the Cheval1er-Eltenton
Affair; and hie presumed opposition to the hydrogen bomb.
In any oonsideration of Oppenheimer's Communist

affiliations, two facts must be taken into account.

First,

all the details of Oppenheimerts past affiliations with
the Party had been recognized in hie previous clearance
proceedings.

Second, it must be realized that during the

30 l s the Communist Party was a relatively respectable organ

ization, or at least one which did not carry the subversive
connotations Which it did in 1954.

Oppenheimer's connec

tions With the Party took place largely wi thin fo..1s "respec
table" period.

According to Oppenheimer, "It wasn't re

garded, perhaps foolishly, as a great state crime to be a
member of the COmmuniBt Party, or aB a matter of dishonor
or shame. "1
Lansdale was worried about the danger 1n the "hyBteria
of the times, over' Commun1sm,"2 which. wa.,s at itB height 1n
the McCarthy ere., 1n contrast to the opposite extreme 10
1940.

In the 40' B, according to LanBdale" attempts to
.-.110
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remove Communists from the army met with the "blind natve
attitude of Mrs. Roosevelt and those around her ..• which
resulted in serious and extreme dama.ge to this country .113
Lansdale felt, moreover, that what was being done in the
trial and by other people in "looking at events that
transpired in 1940 and prior in the light of present feel
ing, rather than in the light of the feeling existing then. II
was extremely dangerous. 4

The facts on Oppenheimer's Communist associations show

that hie Wife had been a Communist and bad formerly been
married to a. Communist; his brother, Frank, and his wife
had also been Party members.

Furthermore, Oppenheimer

himself had been a fellow tre.veler of the Party a.lthough
he never made the move to become a member. 5

He admitted

in the hearing that he had been to Communist meetings.
oontributed money to Cornmln1st causes, and had closely
associated with

Co~stB.

In regard to Communist associations, Harry Alonzo
'White. Chairman of the Technical AdVisory Panel on Atomic
Energy, made the following statement:
I think it is not necessary to assume that
because a man several years ago--I am not refer
ring to Dr. Oppenheimer now, but anyone--was
supporting the Communist Party) partioularly if
he was a youngster in oollege at the time, that
should disqualify him for seourity clearance
today. I hope most 01 us have changed our ideas
about many sUbjiects as we have gone along through
lite. I think 1.n many cases it would be f'ound
that if the true facts could be gotten at, espec
ially the youngsters in college who have supported
the Communist Part,y to some extent or joined it •
••• really did not realize that they were· acting
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inimical to the interests of the country. I
think all of those things should be taken into
consld,erat10n. 6
Oppenheimer t s views on hiring men with Communist
backgrounds for work on atomic development was
out in the hearing.

b~ought

According to Oppenheimer. the fact

that a person had been a Communist did not stop him from
being employed on the bomb work. 7 However t continued
membership in the 'Communist Party was not compe.tlble with
the work at Los Alamos. 8

Mr. Robb asked Oppenheimer if

he felt that "a rather continued or constant association
between a person employed on the atomic bomb project and
Communists or Communist adherents was dangerous. n
Oppenheimer replied:
Potentially dangerous; conceivably dangerous.
Look: I have had a lot of secrets 1n my head
a long time.
It dOEls not matter who I as,soc
iate with. I don It talk a.bout those ,secrets.
Only a. very skillful guy might pick up a trace
of information as to where I had been or what
I was up to. Passing the time of day with a
Communist--I don I t think 1s wise. but I don t t
see that it.1s necessarily dangerous it the
man is discreet and knows what he is, up to. 9

The Chevalle·r-E'ltenton instance is directly involved

with Oppenheimer's Communist associations and is by far
the most serious of the points against him.

this instance are briefly as follows.

The faots on

Haakon Chevalier

and his wife. both of whom were Communists. were close
:fr1ends of the Oppenhe1mers.

According to Oppenheimer,

during a visit of the Chevaliers to the Oppenheimer home
in 1943, Haakon "came into the kitchen and told me that

George Eltenton had spoken to him of the possibility of
transmitting technical informatlon to Soviet scientists.
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I made Bome strong remark that th1.s sounded terribly wrong
to me. 1110

Several months a:rter the incident involving

Chevalier, Oppenheimer reported to security officials that
Eltenton should be watched since he had attempted to obtain
information through three intermediaries.

He refused to

indicate that his friend Chevalier was involved and was,
indeed, the only intermediary.

Furthermore, he concealed

the fact that he hi.mself was the scientist who bad been

approached.

Oppenheimer adm1 t ted the. t he should have

reported the incident sooner ll and was an "idiot" to have
given a false story.12

Hie false story of the three inter

mediaries, rather than only Chevalier, was construed in

the hea.ring to be a IIfabrication of l1ee ll •

Since he lied

10 this instance he could therefore never be trusted.

connection with the

Chevalie~Eltenton incident

In

Oppenheimer

was ca.lled -ror two interviews, one in August 1943 with
Lt. Col. Boris T.Pash and Lt. Lyall

Jo~on,

with Lt. 0'01. Lansdale in September of 1943.

and another
Both of these

interviews were recorded without Oppenheimer's knOWledge
and were played during the hearing to prove what Oppenheimer

had said regarding the espionage attempt.

The third major issue in the hearing, the question of

Oppenheimer1s opposition to the H-bomb, is stated in General
Nichols I' letter to Oppenheimer.

It was further reported that 1n the autumn of
1949" and subseq,uently t you strongly opposed. the,
development of the hydrogen bomb; - (1) on moral,
~OundB, (2) by ~ 1alming that 1 t was not feasible,
(3) by claiming that there were' insuff1cient
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facilities and scientific ~ereonne1 to carry
on the development, and (4) that it was not
politically desirable. It was further re
ported that even a.tter it was determined, as
a matter of national policy, to proceed with
development of a hydrogen bomb, you continued
to oppose the project and declined to cooper
ate fully in the pro.1ect. 13
Nichols furthermore mentions the report that Oppenheimer
slowed down wea.pon development by discouraging others
from working on the hydrogen bomb.
Oppenheimer, in answer to Nichols, stated that he
had been against the bomb development but did not try to
oppose it after the President's decision in 1950 to pro
ceed with the development program.

He further stated

that he "never urged anyone not to work on the hydrogen
bomb prOject. u14
The super bomb issue i8 especially touchy since it
deals with Oppenheimer's opinions and jUdgment.

As has

preViously been mentioned in this pa.per, and was broUght
out in the

heari~

several times, it is necessary to avoid

trying a man for his opinions.

Oppenheimer was criticized

for not promoting the bomb, although it seems o.bvious that
it is difficult to show much enthusiasm over something of
whioh you don't approve.

it.. Major considera.tioru.1n the hearing involved the
-to

degree ... i-f any., which Oppenheimer slowed down the bomb
Wl\e~

development, and

~

this was a sufficient rea.son for con

s1dering him to be a seourity risk.

Oppenheimer himself

felt that his opposition to the bomb and the months of
delibera.tion prio'r to the President's decision did not
cause any substantial dela.y.

'Even if the ideas and p1a.nB

had been formulated ea.rlier, the technical eqUipment would

115
not have been ready. 15
A written statement by Dr. John Manley, professor of

Physios at the University of Washington, gave Oppenheimer
positive support:
find the suggestion that Dr. Oppenheimer
attempted to or did retard the work of the Los
Alamos Laboratory in any field, and speoifically
in the field of thermomlclear weapons, prepos
terous and without foundation •••. The work pro
ceeded with willingness and cooperation trom all
concerned. I know of my QHl1 knowledge that Dr.
Oppenheimer never suggested to me that I should
refrain from working on the thermonuolea.r
weapons program or that I should go slow on
1 t or anytb.1.ng. 16
I

All the scientists who testified did not, however,
~a

with-..Manleyt s opinion.

Dr. Kenneth Sanborn Pitzer,

a chemist from the University of California, felt that
it was likely that Oppenheimer's opposition and lack of
enthusiasm slowed down the progress.

Dr. Alvarez, who

was previously connected with the Manhattan District, and
Dr. Teller of Los Alamos, both testified that they were
shocked by Oppenheimer t s poa1t10n regard1ng the H-bomb,
and were unable to understand hi s oppoaltion. 17

Although the final decision on Oppenhelmer t s clearance
was the duty of the Atomic Energy Commission, many other
people expressed their- opinions and recommendations.

In

the hearing, all the scientists, with the one exception of
Edward Teller, stated that Oppenheimer should be given
cleara."lce.

Teller, when asked if he felt that Oppenheimer

Was a security risk replied "I feel that I would like to
see the vital interests of this country in hands which I
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understand better, and therefore trust more. 1118
On May 27th the Gray Boa.rd sent the recommendations

and findings on the Oppenheimer case to the A.E.C. General
Manager.

Thie report includes detailed consideration of

the 24 a.llegations contained in Nichols t letter of
December 23rd.

In the section of the report regardLng

general considerations, the Board stated that they examined
"some of the great issues and problems brought into focus
by the 0&se." 19

Some of these considerations were stated

as follows:
1.

What, within the 5gamework of this case, is
meant by loyalty?

2.

Can an individual be loyal to the Urrl.ted States

and,

~ivertheleeB,

be considered a security

risk? 

3.

Whether we should take calculated risks where
the national security is involved.

4.

The extent of the right of a citizen to oontin
ued employment by his Go'vernment because of
loyal ,and dist1ngui~~ed accomplishment in
Govenunent serv1ce.

5.

Whether in determining the security statue of
an individual who is a scientist, the Government
must take into account, the rea.ctions of, e.nd the
possible impact upon, all other Bctentists. 23

6.

The role of Bcientlst as ad~~orB in the formu
lation of Government policy.

The procedures governing the hearing r1''1ere based upon
the A.E.C. Act of 1946j upon the Atomic Energy Commission's
published Security Clearanoe Procedures, dated September 12,
1950; and Personnel Security Clearance Criteria for Determin
ing Eligibility, dated November 17, 1950j and upon Executive

Order No. 10450 dated April 27, 1953. ",25

117
In the Board's recommendation not to give Oppenheimer
clearance the following section from the Executive Order
was the major reason for the decision.

It must be deter

mined that lithe employment and retention in employment of

any civilian officer or employee ••. is clearly constant
with the interests of the national security. 1126
In the recommendations of the majority report Gray
and Morgan state:
the most serious f~d1ng would be that of disloyalty
on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer to his count,ry. For
that reason, we ha"Ve given particular attention to
the question of his loyalt,y, and we ha:ve oome to
a. clear conclusion, which should be reassur~ng to
the people of this country, that he is a loyal
citizen. If th1s were the only consideration,
therefore, . we would recommend that the reinstate
ment of his clearance would not be a danger to
the common defense and security.
We hAve J however ,been unable to arrlve at the
oonclusion that it would be clearly consistent with
the security interests of the United States to
relnsta-te Dr. Oppenheimer t ~7c Ieara.nce and J there
fore, do not so recommend.
Dr. E'Vans 1n his minority report stated that he agreed
wi th the findings of the BOa.1"d J however he d1:sagreed with

their majority recommendation.

Evans felt that Oppenheimer

had matured in Judgment since the period \ihen the major
derogatory information applied.

He furthermore stated)

our failure to olear Dr. Oppenheimer W111 be a bla.ck
mark O"D. the escutcheon of our country. His wi tnesaes
are a considerable segment of the scientific back
bone of our Nation and they endorse him. I am wor
ried about the effect an improper decision may
have on the scie.ntific development in oUr cOWltry. 28
Following the recommendation by the Gray Board not to
reinstate Oppenheimer's clearance J Nichols sent the report
to Oppenheimer along Wlth a letter instruc,t1ng him

ot the

118
next prooedure.

Oppenheimer ha.d the opportunity to have

a review of the case by the Personnel Security Review Board.
If he did not request sueh a rev1ew)the General Manager would
make his recommendation to the Commission J which would in

turn. make the final determination.

Oppenheimer preferred

to bypass the Review Board in order to avoid further delay.
The defense f'eared that if the case were not settled by

June 30, when Oppenheimer's contract would expire, his
clearance "might be regarded as moot and might be left in
a state of confusion and uncerta,1nty.u 2 9 Garrison requested
that he be allowed to tlfile a. brief and to make oral argu
ment, II before the Commission to assist Ilin its deliberations. II
The request for an oral argument was not granted, but Nichols

said the written brief would be given "very careful consid
eration. ,,30
In General Nichols' reoommendations to the Commission
he concluded!:
I have conscient1ously weighed the record! of

Dr. Oppenheimer's whole 11t'e, his past contribu
tions, and bie potential future contribut1ons to
the Nation against the security risk that is in
volved in his continued c'leara.nce. In a.dd1'tlon,
I have given consideration to the na.ture ot the
cold war .•• and the horrible prospects of hydrogen
bomb warfare if a.1l-out war shoUld be forced upon
us. From these things a need results to eliminate
froID. classlt1e,d work any individuals who' might
endanger the common defense or security or whose
retention is not clearly consistent with the
interests of' national secur1ty .
Dr. Opp~nhe1merls clearance should not be
relnstated. j1
The A.E.C. voted o,n June 29, 1954 to deny Oppenheimer

a.ccess to restricted da:t.a..

CQmmlss1one,rs Le\d.s Strauss,

Eugene Zuckert; Joseph C,ampbell and Thomas Murry voted for
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the denial, while Henry Smyth was the sole member 1n favor
of Oppenheimer's reinstatement.

The major report by Strauss,

Zuckert, and Campbell stated in their decision "We find

Dr. Oppenhe1m.er is not entitled to the continued confidence
of the Government and of this Commission because of the

proof' of fundamental defects in his • character' .113

2

}.furry, who was in general agreement with the majority,

stated that he reached hie conclusion by hie "own reasoning

which does not coincide with the majority of the COmmission.,,33
Murry's opinion involves an elaborate consideration of the

meaning of loyalty.

Basically, loyalty, according to Murry,

means adherence to the law.

To preserve the freedom of

American life all citizens should cooperate
ment.

~th

the govern

liOn the part of scientists there should be a generous

disposition to endure with patient understanding the dis
tasteful restrictions whioh the security system

~poses

them. 1134 Murry stated in c,oncluslon:

In proportion as a man is charged with more and
more oritical reepons,:1bili ty. the more urgent
become~ the need for that full and exact f1de~1ty
to the special demands of security laws ••••
Dr. Oppenheimer occup1ed a position of
paramount importance; his relation to the secur
ity interests of the United States was the most
intimate possible one. It was reasonable to
expect that he ,,rould manifest the measure of
cooperation appropriate to his responsibIlities.
He d1d not do 80. It was reasonable to eXpect
that he would be particula.rly scrupulous 1'n his
fide11ty to security regulations. These regula
tions are the special test of' the lo,yalty of the
American citizen who serves his Government 1n
the sensitive area of the Atomic Energy Program.
Dr. Oppenheimer did not meet this decisive test.
He was diSloyal.
I conclude that Dr. Oppenheim~rt8 access to
restricted dat.a should be den1.ed. j~

on

1.20
Cb~saloner

smy.th stated

~ ~s

dissenting

opin1oni~

the folloWing passages.
If one starts with the assumption that

Dr. Oppenheimer is disloyal, the incldents
may arouse suspicion. However, it the entire
t ••

record is read objectively, Dr. Oppenheimerts
loyalty and trustworthiness emerge clearly and
the various disturbing incidents are shown in
their proper light as understandable and ~ 
portant •••• With respect to the alleged disregard
Of the security s~ystem, I would suggest that the
system itself is nothing to \rorship •••• I~ a man
proetects the secrets he bas in his hands and
b.1s head, he has shown essential regard for the
security system .••• ln these t~es, failure to
employ a men o~ great talents may impair the
strength and power 0 r thi"s country. Yet I
would aocept this loss if I doubted the loyalty
of Dr. Oppenheimer or his ability to hold his
tongue. I have no such doubts •••• I therefore
have voted to reinstate Dr. Oppenheimer's
<tlearance.36

PART III.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XV

A BRIGHTER FUTURE
The future of scientific development and the relation
ships of the scientist to the government and to society in
the United States is now in the hands of all three parties
concerned--solentists, government men, and society.

If

the scientist continues in the same position which he has
had during the atomic age, soientific development will be
stifled.

It the government oontinues to hamper the scien

tist with unnecessary security measures and security inves
tigations; and if society continues to misunderstand the
scientist and to make ignorant aggressions against him,
science cannot fro 1tf'ully progress.

In 1959, in the Age

of Bputnick, there is a hopeful prospect of e. brighter
future for the scientist.

Bince the firing of the Russian

Sputni,ck, the ,scientist's position has been improving.
So,ciety and the government have been forcefully reminded
of the vital 1mportance of the seientist.

New programs

for education and research in science have been initiated.
The scientist has beoome the idol of many people, and indeed
for a lE'.rge munber of children he

naB replaced the American

eowboy as an identifying figure.
Unfortunately, the scientist's new position of resPect
and importance is a dubious advancement.
122

Too frequently

123
this new position is due to a realization by society that
the scientist is necessary for immediate self-preservation)
rather than e. realization of the innate value of science
which was realized in the periods of great scientific
advancement in the past.

If the proper respect for

science and the scientist 1s to exist, there must be mutual
understanding between men of science, government, and
society" all three working together in a common encompassing
understanding.
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Since the- atomic explosions over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, Japan in 1945"

American society has been aware

of the tremendously distructive energy which is bound up
in the atom and which can now be released by scientists.
FJurthermo,re, society is becoming increasingly aware of
the

n~~ber

of peaceful uses to which atomic energy may

be put in meQicine and in industry.

It is, then, the

powerful PhYsical properties of atomic energy which the
American people realize.
Atomic energy, however, has a secondary power which
is potentially nearly as dangerous as its well recognized
physical powers.

This secondary power has its influence

on the relationships of the government and society to
scientists.
In the atomic age, the scientist's position has
changed in relation to the government now that uluch of
contemporary research is controlled by the government.
The scientist's position has also changed in relation to
the American society as a whole.

The scientist as a

person has become removed from society, since his way of
life-- his motivations, his personality, and the condi
tions necessary for his work-- are no longer understood
by society.
The basis for this Senior Scholar paper is the
1

2

secondary power of

ato~c

energy- its interweaving effects

in government policy and in the attitudes of the govern
ment and society toward the scientist.

Throughout the

paper I have presented a picture of the meaning of
science, the scientific personality, the changes in
science which are linked with social and governmental
changes, and the clash of the government with science, as
exemplified by the security hearing of the leading atomic
scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer.
of the

~econdary

The political aspects

power of atomic energy are Shown directly

in the Oppenheimer hearing, while the social aspects

appear more subtly in various quotations throughout the
paper.
In the chapters on the meaning of science, the con
ditions necessary for its successful purSUit, and the
personality of scientists, it becomes evident why the
very nature of science is not compatible with government
security measures.

The meaning of science is not concerned

wholly with the definition of science and knowledge of
the subject matter involved, but it is concerned in a
larger sense with the feeling for science-- the atmosphere
of excitement in discovery

o~

the unknown.

Science is

not, as the student usually believes, an orderly series
of methods, observat'ions, and conclusions as it is
wri tten up in mod'ern scientific journals.

Rather, .much

confusion, numerous errors t and false conceptions are
experienced before insight is finally seen in a scientific

3
venture.

If the .general public realized that there is

more to science than

knowled~e

of the subject matter and

of the characteristics of science, a substantial decrease
would be made in the remoteness of the scientist from the
society at large.
There are, however, many qualities of scientific
investigation which can be described and explained to the
layman to promote greater understanding of science and
the scientist.

Several such qualities are careful record

ing of accurate, unbiased and pertinent observations; the
creativity involved in synthesizing scientific concepts;
the dynamic quality of science which does not respect
tradition or man-imposed authority; freedon of communication
in science; and the distinction between basic and applied
research.
Three major areas of the scientific personality are
discussed-- the motivations of scientists; traits of the
scientific ,-'1ind; and the discipline which is involved in
scientific work.

The primary motivations of scientists

are a desire to explore the unknown and to contribute to
the rapidly expanding body of scientific
also enjoy

knowled~e.

They

the creative activity of science and the logic

and order of science.

Furthermore, many scientists may

be Dotivated by a desire to help mankind.

The traits of

the scientific mind are closely allied to those of otner
scholars.

he code of discipline enforced on the scientist

by his profession is the main

facto~hich

distinquishes

4

him from men of other in.tellectual pursuits.
This paper surveys the history of the scientist's

relationship t.o society and to the government, in order
to give further understanding of the position of contem
porary scientists.

It also considers the changes in

science itself which have brought about the scientist's
pr~sent

position.

In the great periods of science of the

past, scientific men were an integral part of society.
However, with the advent of modern science and the atomic
age, the scientist finds himself in a position of mis
understanding and disrespect.

The firing of the Russian

Sputnick has brought about an improvement in the scientist's
position, but he is still hampered by government security
ree',ulations.
The government security regulations are intimately
connected with the scientist's

chan~ed

position.

Procedures for securit J and loyalty investigations under
the Atomic Energy Commission Act and the armed services
security program, as well as the government loyalty
program are therefore considered in detail in this Senior
Scholar paper.

Special attention is given to the A.E.C.

criteria for determining security eligibility and the
president's loyalty order which determined the policy

~sed

in the security hearing of J. Robert 0p2enheimer.
It is evident that in times of war, or of potential
war, secrecy in regard to military affairs is especially
necessC:i.ry.

However, many problems have arisen W1der the

----.
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the present security system.

It is necessary to find a

balance between security by achievement and security by
secrecy~

In the atomic age there has been a tendency to

stress secrecy so much that scientific advancement has
been seriously slowed down.
A major part of the

~aper

is devoted to the security

hearing of the leading atomic scientist J. Robert OppenheLmer.
before the Atomic Energy Commis'sion.

The study of the

Oppenheimer hearing gives insight into the scientist's
position in the atomic age

thro~~h

the testimony of leading

scientists, government officials, and laymen.

